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 The following is an inquiry into the intellectual legacy of James W. Carey. This 
study locates, classifies and critiques the three most salient currents of his work: (1) His 
critique of the intellectual history of mass communications and the positivism of the 
media “effects tradition”; (2) his North American cultural studies alternative to the 
dominant ways of knowing in his discipline; (3) and his technological criticism. This 
study finds that while Carey was neglectful is his analysis of institutions and issues of 
political economy, the author argues for a continuation of the conversations that Carey 
began with regards to the ways of knowing in the discipline of Journalism and Mass 
Communications and his analysis of technology and culture.  
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When James W. Carey died in 2006, the headline of his obituary in the New York 
Times read “James W. Carey, Teacher of Journalists, Dies at 71.” It was a fitting tribute. 
Carey was indeed an extraordinary teacher, not only of journalists but also of students 
and fellow scholars, as evidenced in the many memorials and eulogies that appeared in 
scholarly journals after his passing. But he was not simply a teacher. He was also a 
communications theorist, historian, and philosopher. His work ranged widely across 
disciplinary boundaries.  Carey paid little attention to the various lines of departmental 
demarcation and for the most part considered them to be arbitrary.
1
 While such 
boundaries might be useful to higher education administrators in the ordinary business of 
organizing students and allocating funds, for Carey, they served little purpose in 
intellectual inquiry.          
 Carey dusted off old books to explore the relationship between media and culture, 
and he borrowed from thinkers in other disciplines—like Innis, Geertz, and Dewey—and 
synthesized their ideas for his own purposes.
2
 His Times obituary called his tastes 
“eclectic,” but a more contemporary and academic term would be multidisciplinary. 
                                                          
1
 This is not hyperbole. When asked about how he looked at disciplines, departments, and fields of study, 
Carey responded, “[i]n a way, I don’t look at them, or I don’t care about them, or I think they are 
insignificant.” Quoted in James Carey and Tom Reilly, “Putting the World at Peril: A Conversation with 
James W. Carey,” in James Carey: A Critical Reader, eds. Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 102. 
 
2
 On Carey’s intellectual dexterity see G. Stuart Adam, “Jim Carey and the Problem of Journalism 
Education,” Cultural Studies 23, no. 2 (2009): 157. 
 
 2 
Unlike most of his fellow communication scholars during the early years of his career, 
Carey did not think of himself as a social scientist. Rather, he sought to study the media 
as a form of culture, as situated within culture, in the way that literary critics, historians, 
philosophers, anthropologists, and others have sought to study other forms of cultural 
expression, such as the novel or a Balinese cockfight. In other words, Carey wanted to 
interpret the media; he wanted to dig for and articulate meaning in the communications 
systems and media content that inhabited the world, both past and present.   
 Carey was interested in the relationships between people and media—how these 
relationships are established and how they create and define communities. His major 
contribution to the discipline of mass communication was his revaluation and critique of 
the traditional view of the study of communication in the United States. This traditional 
view, the “transmission view,” sees communication as a mechanistic process of sending 
information through space. Carey’s approach to communication merged it with culture 
such that the two become indistinguishable one from another. For Carey, to study 
communication was to study human existence as expressed through its symbolic forms— 
communication as culture. Carey derived his approach to communications from the 
humanities in an effort to unearth deeper meanings and values in our symbolic 
environment.           
 Carey managed to add intellectual depth and heft to the discipline while at the 
same time eschewing the increasingly complex statistical research within the media 
effects tradition that continues to dominate the field. Carey rejected the positivist 
paradigm in communication research with its formally objective methods and reductionist 
procedures; instead, he sought to investigate the values and meanings of mass 
communication using older forms of philosophical and historical argument. He 
 
 3 
introduced the term “cultural studies” as a term for his intellectual endeavor in 1963.
3
 
 This thesis is a study of James W. Carey’s scholarship and its contributions to the 
“cultural turn” in communications research. The book Thinking with James Carey 
provides a useful example as to the spirit of this thesis. In the introduction to this 
collection of essays, the editors inform readers that their book does not intend to propose 
that one think as James Carey, but rather with him
4
 or alongside him. With this idea as a 
guiding principle, my analysis of Carey’s contributions to the study of communication 
will use a methodological dialogism that will extend the conversation that Carey began 
with a hermeneutic intent;
 5
 in other words, I plan to extend the conversation that Carey 
began without the expectation of finding any final answers to the questions and issues 
contained in his work. Instead, I wish to highlight what I find to be the most important 
ideas in his thinking about the study of communication. This thesis will attempt to 
examine the work of Carey as an “epistemic individual,” as Jonathan Sterne referred to 
him—an author whose work has come to stand as a marker for a particular way of 
knowing—by outlining his proposals for the cultural study of communication and 
                                                          
3
 James W. Carey, “Reflections on the Project of (American) Cultural Studies,” in Cultural Studies in 
Question, eds. Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc., 1997), 3.  
 
4
 Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson, introduction to Thinking with James Carey, eds. Jeremy Packer and 
Craig Robertson (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 1-10. 
 
5
 See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
357-389.  I am using the term ‘hermeneutic intent’ as direct reference to Rorty’s notion that hermeneutics is 
not method for attaining truth but for greater understanding – verstehen -- although Rorty does not use the 
term. Put another way, according to Rorty hermeneutics is an attempt to make sense of what is happening 
at a stage where we are still unsure of how even to describe it and then to proceed “nonreductively.” 
Rorty’s conceptualization of hermeneutics draws heavily from the book Truth and Method by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer that he (Rorty) reads as a tract against the very notion of method in philosophy. I will address the 




exploring the subsequent debates and questions it leaves for his readers.
6
   
 The methodological approach to this project will first involve an analysis of 
Carey’s scholarship with respect to the three most salient currents in his work: his 
critique of positivism; his cultural studies alternative; and his cultural/historical inquires 
into communications technology. Secondly, this study will investigate the intellectual 
history of mass communications in order to situate Carey among his peers and 
contextualize his thought. I am using the phrase “intellectual history” in the same way 
that the journalism historian David Paul Nord uses it, meaning simply a history of 
thought.
7
            
 The aim of any intellectual history is to delineate intellectual presuppositions, 
identify general patterns of thought and central debates, and then analyze how these 
issues evolve over time.
8
 For example, the first era of interest for this study will be the 
period of intellectual domination of positivist social scientific research following the 
Second World War and enduring into the Cold War.  The second era begins with the anti-
positivist revolt that became widespread throughout the social sciences and mass 
communications in the 1960s; this decade marks the beginning of the cultural turn in 
communications research. By the mid-to late 1990s, American cultural studies reached a 
period of uncertainty as some academics attacked it for being too celebratory of popular 
                                                          
6
 Jonathan Sterne, “James Carey and Resistance to Cultural Studies in North America,” Cultural Studies 23, 
no. 2 (2009): 283. Here, Sterne borrows the term ‘epistemic individual’ from the French thinker Pierre 
Bourdieu; see Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988).  
 
7
 David Paul Nord, “Intellectual History, Social History, Cultural History, and Our History,” Journalism 
Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1990): 645. 
 
8
 John C. Greene, “Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History,” The Mississippi Valley Historical 




media culture and for becoming too politically disengaged and historically ill-informed.
9
 
My methodological intent for this thesis is to track these intellectual patterns and Carey’s 
relationship to them within their historical context.      
 This thesis is less a strict biography of James W. Carey and more an analysis of 
his thought and its relation to the intellectual currents within his own discipline; in that 
sense, it might be useful to call it an intellectual biography. By Carey’s “discipline” I 
mean the academic profession of journalism and mass communications in which he was a 
teacher and administrator, but Carey’s scholarly work was by its nature multidisciplinary 
and hard to fit into any specific typology. Carey dealt with issues of culture, 
communications theory, journalism, media, politics, technology, and methodology 
throughout his career in many different contexts. Since any attempt to categorize Carey’s 
subject matter would in some way be insufficient, I will use the general term 
“communications” when referring to it. The best method for defining the nature of 
Carey’s subject matter is to discuss it and trace some of its unifying themes, a major goal 
for this project, rather than attempting to define it explicitly.   
Thesis Outline           
The first chapter will discuss and explore Carey’s critique of the “media effects 
tradition,” the reigning social scientific paradigm in the study of mass communications. 
Even a casual reader of Carey would notice that much of his work is concerned with the 
intellectual trajectory of North American mass communications research. Indeed, the first 
four chapters of his most well-known book, Communication as Culture, address the 
                                                          
9
 Catherine A. Warren and Mary Douglas Vavrus eds., introduction to American Cultural Studies (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002), 1-11; Daniel Czitrom, “Does Cultural Studies Have a Past?” in 
American Cultural Studies, 13-22.  
 
 6 
issues of the scientism in mass communication research and the alternative paths he 
advocated. This first chapter will add to the conversation about “positivism” in the 
discipline by reviewing Carey’s critique and by explaining the institutional background 
of “scientism” and its lack of success in finding mechanistic explanations for human 
communication.         
 Of course, Carey did not simply advocate that the media effects tradition be 
abandoned with nothing left in its place. The second chapter will discuss Carey’s project 
of “cultural studies” as his desired path for inquiry in communication. In other words, this 
chapter will be concerned with Carey’s epistemological position. It will explore his 
discussion of the transmission and ritual binary in communication research and 
communication itself, as well as his commitment to and advocacy of democratic ideals 
and philosophical pragmatism in scholarship.  This chapter will also address the various 
criticisms and debates that accompany the adoption of cultural studies in university 
curricula and Carey’s reaction to these debates. For example, critics of Carey’s form of 
American cultural studies have claimed that his cultural approach to studying media does 
not adequately address power relations in society. This chapter will address these 
criticisms and probe Carey’s views on power relations in culture. This discussion will 
examine his relation to the political lines that became drawn as splits began to occur in 
cultural studies between those who favored the political economic analysis of institutions 
and those, like Carey, who favored a cultural analysis that was less politically motivated 
and sought primarily to understand the cultural rituals and symbols of others. 
 The final chapter of this thesis will address Carey’s ideas concerning “technology 
and ideology.” Carey’s concern with communications technology sprang from his interest 
in the work of Canadian academics Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis and their 
 
 7 
analysis of different forms of technology. Carey’s attention to technology and its 
relationship to political and popular culture is a major theme in his scholarship, and he 
returned to it many times throughout his career. Carey’s approach to technology includes 
a critique of it as an ideological category, the utopian belief that technology progresses 
naturally towards improving the human condition, a position Carey and his co-author 
John Quirk firmly rejected.        
 To support his position against this ideology of technology, Carey focused his 
analysis on how the physical structure of a technology, like the telegraph, influenced its 
use and cultural effects. For example, in his well-known essay on the telegraph, Carey 
argued that the telegraph “reworked the nature of written language and finally the nature 
of awareness itself”
10
 and made obsolete more long form, nuanced, and detailed news 
reporting in favor of the transmission of bits of information.  In this chapter, I will outline 
the origins of Carey’s views on technology and their considerable relationship to the 
thought of Canadian economist Harold Innis, whose work I argue is essential to a fuller 
understanding of Carey’s own work on technology.  
Background            
James William Carey was born in Providence, Rhode Island, on September 7, 
1934, the second of six children. During the war, his father worked in the shipyards and 
his mother in the textile mills. Carey described his family’s ongoing employment status 
as a constant flow of ups and downs between relative economic security and unexpected 
job loss, but they were never abjectly poor. None of his immediate family had university 
educations; in fact, Carey was the first in his family to go to college. But his family was 
                                                          
10
 Carey, “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph,” in Communications as Culture (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 162.  
 
 8 
very politically active: both his mother and aunt were union organizers when they were 
not working in the mills, and it is no doubt that Carey’s intellectual development was 
influenced by this early exposure to political life.
11
      
 Carey was diagnosed with a congenital heart disease when he was in the first 
grade at a time when the only treatment for such an aliment was a recommendation for 
rest and isolation from crowded places like schools. So, because of his illness, Carey was 
kept out of school until he was 14 years old. Unable to join the military and unfit for 
factory work, Carey was able to go to the University of Rhode Island on a disability 
scholarship in 1952. Carey had an intuitive grasp of subjects like history and English but 
was unable to enroll in a liberal arts program because he lacked the necessary high school 
credits. So, Carey received his degree in business taking mostly economics and business 
administration courses. After completing his degree, he went on to graduate school to 
study journalism and advertising at the University of Illinois because he considered it to 
be the “safe route” as he had written for a student newspaper and thought he might go 
someplace where he could write journalistically.
12
      
 Carey finished his Ph.D. at Illinois after having written two dissertations, one on 
economics and communications (he was not happy with this work), and one on Harold 
Innis and Marshall McLuhan (he was pleased with this work and later published it). 
Obviously, his diverse interests were evident early in his career. He eventually became a 
professor at the University of Illinois in the department of journalism, where he taught 
communications courses that were offered as electives. It was then, in the fall of 1963, as 
                                                          
11
 Carey and Lawrence Grossberg, "From New England to Illinois" in Thinking with James Carey, 11-13.  
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a young professor, that Carey first suggested the title of Cultural Studies as a label for the 
study of the media and society.
13
       
 Carey went on to lead a distinguished academic career, which included becoming 
Dean of the College of Communications at the University of Illinois in 1979, and then in 
1992 joining the faculty at Columbia University’s School of Journalism. At Columbia, 
Carey was instrumental in founding a Ph.D. program in communications and philosophy 
within the journalism school that was a separate entity from the professional degrees the 
school offered. Carey had to fight to ensure others within the department that his program 
would not impinge on the professional programs, but his goal was to add a deep 
intellectual foundation to a school whose original purpose was to train journalists not 
produce academics. Carey, in many ways, added a depth to his field whose legacy can 
certainly be felt today.
14
         
 To examine the work of James Carey is to uncover the ideas of someone with a 
unique perspective. Carey’s work was essentially a constant dialogue with his own 
discipline, his role as an educator, and the surrounding culture. To read his work, then, is 
to encounter many of the major epistemological debates and fissures that lay hidden 
under the surface of the research done within the schools of journalism and mass 
communications and beyond. By focusing on just one man, one uncovers the major 
philosophical questions as to what it means to engage in social inquiry and the difficult 
issues that must be negotiated as to the role of the “expert” within a democratic society. 
Therefore, to read Carey is to become immersed in the history of his discipline and to 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., 20.  
 
14
 James Boylan, Pulitzer’s School: Columbia University’s School of Journalism, 1903-2003 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 240. 
 
 10 
engage in a conversation that should never stop as to the proper role of social inquiry in 
human affairs. Such debates do not come with easy answers, but by examining Carey’s 
thought in relation to his discipline, it is my hope to open up these debates and to keep 







CAREY AND THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 
The following chapter is concerned with the epistemology of the “media effects 
tradition” and Carey’s case for abandoning it. Carey once remarked that in order to 
successfully interpret a scholarly text, one must “grasp the structure of the argument into 
which it is an entry and the identity of the combatants to which it is addressed.”
15
  With 
this comment in mind, I can think of no better way to approach the nature of Carey’s own 
work in this area. Without some contextual background, especially as to the combatants 
Carey was addressing, some of his more important epistemological claims might go 
overlooked. Therefore, this chapter will locate Carey’s place in the history of the study of 
mass communications by reviewing its dominant research traditions and also by 
examining Carey’s contribution to our understanding of them. This exercise will be a 
small but important contribution to the intellectual history of the discipline. 
A “Lay Epistemologist”  
Carey was quick to remind his readers that the intellectual trajectory of his 
discipline was (and is) situated within a context or a history of thought.
16
 Carey’s 
                                                          
15
 Carey, “The Roots of Modern Media Analysis: Lewis Mumford and Marshall McLuhan,” in James 
Carey: A Critical Reader, 31.  
 
16
 I think it is important to note that the term “history” is loaded such that the philosopher M. Foucault 
avoided it and thus borrowed the Nietzschean terms “genealogy” and “archeology” to describe his 
historical investigations. The problem that Foucault and others have sought to avoid is that the term 
“history” in western society implies a linear narrative of continuous progression and rationality (with a 
beginning, middle, and end). It is important in discussions of the intellectual history of mass 
 
 12 
thinking on such matters was influenced by Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), whose book The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions brought the challenge of historical interpretation to the 
belief that science is an accumulation of knowledge that gradually moves towards an 
exact understanding of physical reality. Kuhn, a physicist and scientific historian, argued 
famously that the practice of “normal science” operates within dominant paradigms that 
determine basic assumptions, directions for inquiry, methodology, and issues of 
verisimilitude.
17
 For Kuhn, a revolution in science occurs when a dominant paradigm is 
overturned; put somewhat differently, a revolution in science occurs when a new solution 
to a problem is discovered that violates the standards of the old research tradition but 
whose logic comes to be accepted by the relevant community.
18
 Kuhn’s project showed 
the historical context in which such revolutions took place and how older ideas give way 
to new ones by being completely reconstituted.    
 Considering that he was heavily concerned with larger epistemological issues in 
the study of mass communications, it is of little surprise that Carey admired the work of 
Kuhn. An extraordinary scientific historian and epistemologist, Kuhn almost single-
handedly dismantled the image of natural science as a self-contained enterprise that 
operated efficiently on its own internal logic. The effects of Kuhn’s ideas were felt well 
beyond the disciplinary boundaries of scientific history and made “paradigm” one of the 
most used words in academic English. For instance, it is revealing that Carey referred to 
the dominant “paradigm” in the study of mass communications as the “media effects 
                                                                                                                                                                             
communications to remember that this story is somewhat discontinuous and that the passage of time does 
not necessarily ensure progress.   
 
17
 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
 
18
 See discussion in Ronald N. Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), 32-38.  
 
 13 
tradition.” Carey consciously avoided the term paradigm because, as a lay epistemologist 
himself, he was well aware of the implications of using the term because of its 
relationship to the natural sciences. Kuhn had used “paradigm” in the context of natural 
science--the majority of his examples were from physics--but Carey had no interest in 
constructing the study of mass communication as a science searching for natural laws and 
falsifiable claims.          
 Carey’s project was a revolt against positivism in the social sciences more 
generally and the study of mass communications in particular. Carey wanted essentially 
to shape the study of the media into a new branch of the humanities.
19
  An eloquent critic, 
Carey stood for a complete rejection of the idea that only through the application of 
methodologies from the natural sciences could social inquiries be both reliable and valid 
(this is sometimes called naturalism). Carey was annoyed by the reductionism in the 
positivist research of the effects tradition, and he viewed it as a stagnant intellectual 
outlook that avoided the complexity of social life in the pursuit of a “value free” science 
of mass communications.         
 Carey was well informed about the intellectual history of the research traditions 
that fall under the umbrella of journalism and mass communications. Carey’s interest in 
this history was not coincidental, of course; Carey used his discussions about the 
intellectual history of his discipline as a weapon to advocate for a major shift in its 
dominant research traditions. By discussing this history, Carey pointed to the politically 
and culturally contingent factors that had influenced his discipline’s development in order 
to strengthen his call for an alternative path.       
                                                          
19
 Carey, “Humanities are Central to Doctoral Studies.” Insights: The Journal of the Association of Schools 
of Journalism and Mass Communication (1989): 2-5.  
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 Carey’s audience was a generation of quantitative, social scientific, mass 
communications scholars committed to the “empirical” study of media effects. Stephan 
Jay Gould’s comment that most natural scientists “don’t care a fig about history” is 
generally true for social scientists as well.
20
 Quantitative social scientists in mass 
communications are trained to gather and analyze data; they are adept in operationalizing 
concepts, finding statistical correlations, and interpreting data sets. All of these 
techniques are standard operating procedure in the methodological canon of mass 
communications research, which primarily includes quantitative content media analysis, 
mass social scientific surveying, and psychological experimentation. But social scientists 
do not study, or even give much thought to, the history of the intellectual processes in 
which they are engaged. Beginning in the early 1960s and 1970s, Carey began to remind 
professional social scientists in communication that the methodological traditions and 
epistemological claims to which they were committed had a history and one not without 
controversy and relevant philosophical debates.   
Carey, Intellectual History, and Mass Communications  
Carey described the path of communications research in the United States as 
guided by two models, which he expressed in another one of his characteristic binaries. In 
his words, “one model of communication was seen as a mode of domination, in another 
as a form of therapy; in one model people were motivated to pursue power and in the 
other to flee anxiety.”
21
 Carey’s two models did, in fact, encompass a great deal of the 
type of the research done in the so-called media effects tradition. Yet, the most important 
                                                          
20
 Stephan Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 25. 
  
21




contribution of Carey was not the generalizability of this binary. What is most important 
was Carey’s effort to remind his readers of an obvious fact, that these two models “were 
also models for the enactment of the communication process, powerful models of an 
actual social practice [emphasis mine].”
22
 That is, as an actual social practice, the 
research done within these two models responded to, and was shaped by, the social 
context in which they emerged.        
 Of course, Carey’s scholarship in these areas of intellectual history had more of 
an influence on his students and sympathetic acquaintances than his quantitative social 
scientist colleagues. One such acquaintance, the historian Daniel Czitrom, went on to 
write one of the more balanced accounts of the history of the “media effects” tradition 
that was far more wide-ranging than versions common in the field in the 1980s when he 
wrote. Heavily influenced by Carey, much of Czitrom’s historiography of the study of 
mass communications in the U.S. was an extension of Carey’s own thought in book 
length form; it included figures like John Dewey, Robert Park, Charles Cooley, Harold 
Innis, and Marshall McLuhan, all figures who were not normally included in effects 
tradition history unlike figures like Walter Lippmann or Paul Lazarsfeld.
23
 Czitrom, a 
professional historian by trade, added analytical depth to the alternative history that 
Carey originated.         
 The intellectual history of the media-effects tradition is a story about the eventual 
confluence of a variety of different enterprises that, for various reasons, took an interest 
in understanding the social impact of modern mass communications. Czitrom provided a 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., 113. 
  
23
 For his reflection on the influence of Carey on his book, see Daniel J. Czitrom, “Twenty-five years later,” 




useful taxonomy of these types of research, what he called “empirical media study,” and 
it included the following categories: (1) propaganda analysis; (2) public opinion analysis; 
(3) social psychological analysis; and (4) marketing.
24
 The basic premise of all of these 
forms of effects research presupposed that mass media had at least some form of effect 
on an audience’s attitudes and behavior, and all of this research wanted to know more in 
order to utilize and/or control the power of the new mass media environment.   
 All of these forms of research relied on a positive science of social relations, 
which is essentially what Czitrom was referring to when he wrote of “empirical media 
study.” He suggested that that these founding researchers’ understanding of human action 
owed tacitly to the behaviorism of J.B. Watson and relied heavily on quantitative social 
scientific methods believed to uphold professional standards for objectivity. These forms 
of inquiry assumed a stolid quality and presentation, or as Carey put it, “[t]hey assume 
that the flattened scientific forms of speech and prose, that peculiar  quality of presumed 
disinterest and objectivity, are the only mode in which truth can be formulated.”
25
 This 
style of inquiry owed to the standards for objectivity that had found new life in the 1920s 
in American sociology, and elsewhere, as the old idea that social inquiry should imitate 
the natural sciences became more prominent during the interwar period and remained 
dominant through much of the Cold War.
26
      
                                                          
24
 Daniel J. Czitrom, “The Rise of Empirical Media Study,” in Media and the American Mind: From Morse 
to McLuhan (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 122-146.  
 
25
 Carey, “Mass Communication and Cultural Studies,” in Communication as Culture, 38.   
 
26
 The idea that social inquiry should imitate the natural sciences can be traced to French philosopher 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857). For an examination of Comte’s ideas on American intellectual life see Gillis 
Harp, Positivist Republic: Auguste Comte and the Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1920 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1995); On the scientism of American sociology see 
Robert C. Bannister, Sociology and Scientism: 1880-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 




 Of course, one immediately notices that Czitrom’s taxonomy was quite 
fragmented, filled with a range of institutional prerogatives and varying political and 
cultural struggles. Carey’s audacious opening sentence to his 1996 essay, “The Chicago 
School and the History of Mass Communications Research,” spoke to this inherent 
fragmentation when he wrote that “[s]trictly speaking there is no history of mass 
communications research.”
27
 He went on to explain that a whole host of writers, 
impossible to classify or lump together, from as far back as the seventeenth century had 
been writing about issues that could fall under the heading mass communications; it was 
thus almost impossible to assemble a clear linear narrative about this kind of intellectual 
history.           
 Carey pointed out that what is called the “history of mass communications 
research” is merely a recently assembled and relatively minor literary genre. In Carey’s 
version of the story, the intellectual history of the effects tradition had been assembled for 
a variety of purposes in order to justify and legitimate a new twentieth-century invention 
of the mass media and its related institutions, and to give direction and status to a 
                                                          
27
 Carey, “The Chicago School and the History of Mass Communications research,” James Carey: A 
Critical Reader, 14. In this essay, Carey argued, essentially, that the work of what is generally referred to 
as the “Chicago School of Sociology,” namely the work of Robert Park, Charles Cooley, and John Dewey, 
contained observations about communications that were a necessary component of a more complete 
intellectual history of the discipline of mass communications. But Carey’s discussion of the “Chicago 
School of Sociology” was a highly bracketed one that only included the work of the three aforementioned 
authors. Obviously, some scholars have criticized Carey’s characterization of the “Chicago School” 
because it reduced an entire department to the thought of a few scholars–although, Carey was hardly the 
first to utilize the “Chicago School” trope. Obviously, a fuller view of the “Chicago School” would take 
into account the departmental divides that existed because this famous department was made up of 
academics with very different, sometimes competing views very much at odds with one another. See 
discussion in Jefferson Pooley, “Daniel Czitrom, James W. Carey, and the Chicago School,” Critical 
Studies in Mass Communication 24, no. 5 (2007): 469-472; See also Harold S. Becker, “The Chicago 




professional class of teachers and research serving those institutions.
28
 In other words, the 
field’s origin story had been constructed to legitimize the needs of a new professionalized 
class of teachers, researchers, and media workers. The actual history, though, is much 
more fragmented and messy.         
 Therefore, given the fragmented nature of research in mass communications, the 
dangers of constructing an alternative intellectual history are fraught with potential cliffs 
and hurdles.
29
 This is because an “intellectual history” is a historiography of ideas that 
attempts to examine multiple, fluid strains of thought and research. The subject matter is 
further complicated by the fact that some research traditions are in active competition 
with others, some are dominant and others not—and some remain dormant waiting to be 
discovered again. Nevertheless, the perceived intellectual history, or rather the dominant 
one, bounds academic practice to an identity about the research being carried out and its 
methods and goals. Carey understood this and sought to change the perception of this 
history with a critical analysis and an alternative version that included thinkers like John 
Dewey, Harold Innis, and even Clifford Geertz. 
A Brief History Media Effects Research: “Strong Effects” 
The standard version of the media effects research tradition’s history – by which I 
mean the version that is told by practitioners in mass communications – begins in the 
years surrounding WWI. Of course, as mentioned before, much commentary had been 
written before this time period that could certainly be considered research into mass 
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communications, but one must begin somewhere, and this is generally considered to be 
the genesis of the more modern forms of “media effects” research.
30
 Research into what 
came to be called the “hypodermic needle” view of communications, which is the view 
that mass media messages have a direct influence on one’s thoughts and behavior (the 
“strong effects” view), began during this time and was shaped in the context of mass 
industrial warfare.  Carey’s comment that the history of communications research was 
“hardly an innocent history” was an allusion to this war-related aspect of this intellectual 
history.
31
 More generally, this early history of “media effects” research in the United 
States was tied almost exclusively to the interests of commercialism and the state, with 
the possible exception of social psychological analysis, which in its infancy was 
concerned with the effects of mass media on children and adolescents.  
 Commercial interests in mass communications research were very 
straightforward. In the years following WWI, consumer surveys were widespread among 
marketers as improvements in statistical sampling and survey techniques added the 
verisimilitude of these types of social data. The importance of market research increased 
in tandem with the growth of commercial radio because, unlike print media, a radio 
program’s audience could not be calculated with a simple observation of circulation.
32
 As 
the historian Sarah Igo has made clear, however, it was not obvious in the 1920s that the 
public would be open to the prying questions of market researchers. Indeed, businesses 
had to be convinced as to the utility of these new methods of consumer research even if 
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they stood to gain from this type of data. Consumer surveys and their associated data on 
consumer behavior were made “valid” and acceptable by a fluid socio-cultural process 
that shaped the perception of the public as much as it reflected it.
33
   
 Research into the effects of propaganda became a significant endeavor on the part 
of all the governments involved in both world wars. In the United States, much attention 
was paid to what historian Christopher Simpson has aptly called the “science of 
coercion,” or rather wartime propaganda efforts that included all of the seemingly 
innocuous and more nefarious efforts one might expect of a government trying to 
persuade a passive domestic population to support war and then to convince an enemy of 
its defeat.
34
           
 Naturally, such a new and concentrated effort to alter public opinion on behalf of 
the state came with a subsequent backlash and a general apprehension towards the newer 
mass media and its power. Postwar views among the public towards propaganda became 
loaded with a view of sinister forces hard at work to control the opinions of an unwitting 
public. Such anxieties about the mass media’s power and the potential of that perceived 
power in service of national interests became the focus of much of the earlier research on 
state propaganda and its effects as the research reflected on these popular anxieties.
35
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 Carey’s power and anxiety models of communications research are encapsulated 
in the word propaganda itself. In his well-known book Propaganda, Edward Bernays, 
nephew of Sigmund Freud and the so-called “father of public relations,” examined the 
etymology of the word propaganda and pointed out that the word did not gain its negative 
connotation for subversive mendacity until the 1920s.
36
 It was not until after the first and 
second world wars that the word in popular parlance was used with the ubiquitous 
negative connotation it has today. The final straw was, of course, the Nazi regime. That 
infamous regime’s use of propaganda forever made the word itself forever associated 
with lies, half-truths, and mass manipulation. To take one example: consider the writings 
of radical writers like Emma Goldman in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
 
centuries. 
The word propaganda was used quite frequently and with a positive connation, in this 
case with an aim to propagate a socialist and revolutionary ideology.
37
  
 The political scientist Harold Lasswell was one of the forerunners of early 
propaganda research and is considered one of the founders of mass communications 
research as well. His work on the style and techniques of propaganda focused on the 
individual psychology of central political figures—Hitler, for example—and how their 
personalities reflected on their attempts to manipulate mass public opinion through the 
alteration and manipulation of symbols. Lasswell also studied propaganda from a more 
macro perspective, looking into questions of how the media operated, its role in politics, 
and how it could be utilized to manage public opinion in an American context.
38
 And it 
                                                          
36
 Edward Bernays, Propaganda (Brooklyn: Ig Publishing, 2005). 
 
37
 See Emma Goldman, Anarchism and other Essays (Dover Publications: Mineola, 1969). 
 
38
 Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); for 
Lasswell’s definition of propaganda see Lasswell, “The Theory of Political Propaganda,” The American 
Political Science Review 21, no. 3 (1927): 627-631. 
 
 22 
was Lasswell who famously coined the major question to which a science of 
communication should be directed: “who says what in which channel to whom with what 
effect.”
39
 Lasswell’s conception of this new science was that social scientists would 
reveal how to use mass media to influence target audiences, and they would do this 
through an ostensibly apolitical process of scientific progression and application of the 
resulting knowledge.          
 Lasswell is also credited with developing the first forms of quantitative content 
analysis, one part of the methodological trinity of “empirical media effects research” that 
includes social scientific surveys and psychological experiments. Carey’s models of 
power and anxiety communications research were embodied in Lasswell’s work, most 
noticeably in his views on the proper uses of propaganda and the role of social scientists 
in shaping public opinion through the mass media, what Edward Bernays called the 
“engineering of consent.” But for Carey, the major thinker that laid the foundation for 
research about the media was, of course, the “father of American journalism,” Walter 
Lippmann whose book Public Opinion (1922) made the role of the expert essential for 
the shaping of the public mind and the smooth functioning of an “administrative 
democracy.”   
Public Opinion Research 
The history of mass communication research in the effects tradition is closely 
aligned with the quantitative techniques of mass polling. Many of the sampling methods 
and survey techniques for public opinion research common today were fully developed 
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by the mid-1930s. But the academic concern with public opinion and polling had taken 
shape during the Progressive Era (roughly 1890-1920), mainly in response to the 
explosive issues concerning labor and capital. Labor statistics bureaus began to flourish 
as reformers needed to be able to point to more balanced reports and less controversial 
data collection.
40
 The quantification of social facts was a socially progressive 
phenomenon, and it encouraged the growth of a professionalized class trained in the 
statistical methods necessary to gather the data and interpret the results.   
 Indeed, the quantitative measurements of public opinion by national surveys and 
mass polling have transformed the way the public is conceived, marketed to, and 
governed in the modern United States.
41
 Methods of mass surveying are techniques that 
enforce a high level of discipline on both the administrators of the survey and of the 
respondents; in this process, opinions themselves were formally standardized. Social 
scientists in the interwar period learned quickly that logically equivalent forms of the 
same question produced very different answers, and so the level of standardization had to 
be increased to decrease this variation.
42
 But the forms of standardization and the mode 
of quantification used have never been completely divorced from power relations in the 
workforce and elsewhere. The difference between public opinion polls and surveys of 
academics provides a vivid example of this dynamic. Where opinion polling relied on 
standardized questions and answers, surveys of academic “attitude”––or rather their 
opinions on social issues––allowed for survey administrators to rephrase questions, vary 
                                                          
40
 For a discussion about the historical context of the uses of the social scientific survey in the U.S., see 
Stephan Park Turner and Jonathan H. Turner, The Impossible Science: An Institutional Analysis of 
American Sociology (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), 15-28. 
 
41
 Igo, The Averaged American, 1-22.  
 
42
 Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 34.  
 
 24 
the order, and allowed for the respondent to use their own words. Public opinion polling, 
on the other hand, was only made valid after the fact, after the questions and answers 
adhered to an acceptable level of discipline that could be quantified and analyzed.
43
   
 The academic concern with public opinion in early twentieth century America 
was in part a further outgrowth of Carey’s “power and anxiety” model, but also in part 
what media scholar Michael Schudson has called a “democratic realism” that emerged in 
the 1920s.
44
 This “democratic realism” found its most articulate spokesman in a former 
government propagandist and journalist, Walter Lippmann. Lippmann pointed to the 
problems inherent in democracy given the fact that it was impossible for an average 
citizen to be totally informed about all the issues confronting the nation at any given time. 
He argued famously that it was necessary for the establishment of an independent 
“intelligence bureau” to provide expert and objective opinions based on factual 
information to political leaders and the public.
45
     
 Lippmann’s democratic realism was the first complete articulation of a new brand 
of administrative democracy, that is, a type of civics that placed the role of “experts” over 
that of the “public” and is essentially the brand of democracy that is characteristic of 
American politics today. John Dewey famously argued against the necessity of a new 
class of experts to shape public opinion in a review of Lippmann’s book Public Opinion, 
first published by the magazine The New Republic in 1927.
46
 Carey’s reappraisal of this 
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Dewey/Lippmann debate––with Carey, of course, siding with Dewey––influenced many 
journalism historians’ and media scholars’ understanding of the role of the expert in a 
democratic society.
47
 Carey, like Dewey, believed that the establishment of Lippmann’s 
intelligence bureau would merely lead to a group of academics primarily concerned with 
their own status and prestige rather than serving the greater public interest.  
 In an essay first published in 1982, Carey characterized Lippmann’s notion of 
“democratic realism” in the following way: “Lippmann endorsed the notion that it was 
possible to have a science of society such that scientists might constitute a new 
priesthood: the possessors of truth as a result of having an agreed upon method for its 
determination.”
48
 In an essay published in 1995, Carey built on his original critique of 
Lippmann and argued that Lippmann’s notion of “democratic realism” relegated 
journalism to the practice of translating the “arcane language of experts” into something 
digestible by a mass public.
49
 This translation process transmitted the judgments of 
experts and in this process ratified those judgments legitimate. In this sense, the public 
played no role in the democratic process and was instead only an audience to the 
decisions made on their behalf. In Carey’s words, “[p]ublic opinion no longer refers to 
opinions being expressed in public and then recorded by the press. Public opinion is 
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formed by the press and then modeled by the public opinion industry and the apparatus of 
polling.
50
                
 In Carey’s version, it was Lippmann who marked the genesis of the culturally 
resonant notion that experts should play the primary role in American conversations 
about civics.  According to Carey, Lippmann’s Public Opinion “founded or at least 
clarified a continuous tradition of research” on the mass media.
51
 Yet, despite the power 
of his rhetorical ability, Lippmann simply gave an articulate voice to a cultural trend that 
was already under way. It is true that by the late 1930s social scientists began to view 
research in the effects of mass media as a realm of inquiry in which a new disciplinary 
field could be organized.  But in terms of the establishment of a new “priestly class,” 
these types of professional modes of social inquiry, attempts to establish a science of 
society, had begun to gain favor in the U.S. as early as the late
 
nineteenth century, well 
before Lippmann’s book was published in 1922.
52
 Yet Carey’s focus on Lippmann served 
to address the standard version about the intellectual foundations of “effects tradition” 
research––this focus on Lippmann was a politically motivated attack on the underlying 
ideological premise of the positivist media research in his own discipline.   
 Lippmann’s “intelligence bureau” was, of course, never formed in the precise way 
that he proposed; nevertheless, the spirit of his proposal gained traction. Survey 
techniques and social scientific methods for national polling made “mass society,” or 
rather national public opinion, comprehensible to an emerging class of professional social 
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scientists; and these social scientists, in mass communications and elsewhere, followed 
Lippmann’s articulation of the role of the social expert by clinging to a self-image of 
detachment and objectivity; in doing so, they added to their prestige and respectability, 
especially in the context of the political circumstances that arose during the Cold War. 
The founding of the academic journal Public Opinion Quarterly in 1937 embodied the 
essence of Lippmann’s call for a new role of the public opinion expert. The forward in 
the inaugural issue illustrates this point: 
A new situation has arisen throughout the world, created by the spread of literacy among 
the people and the miraculous improvement of the means of communication. Always the 
opinions of relatively small publics have been a prime force in political life, but now, for 
the first time in history, we are confronted nearly everywhere by mass opinion as the final 
determinant of political and economic action…. Scholarship is developing new 
possibilities of scientific approach as a means of verifying hypotheses and of introducing 
greater precision of thought and treatment.
53
 
This statement showcases the anxiety, hopes, and desires of the new “priestly class” in 
discovering a positive science of communication that is clearly in line with Lippmann’s 
original thesis.  
Social Psychology: From Strong to Limited Effects 
If much of the early media effects tradition discussed thus far dealt in the realm of 
commercialism and politics, and by extension an overarching concern with media and 
political power, the last form of the effects tradition to become dominant dealt in the 
realm of social psychology.  In terms of this social psychological approach, the Payne 
Fund studies on motion pictures and children are an early example of the dawn of this 
type of analysis. The Payne Fund studies were twelve studies coordinated by W.W. 
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Charters in the early 1930s that sought to examine the effects of viewing movies on 
children and adolescents.
54
 The study authors generally acknowledged the complexity of 
the situation—specifically that it was difficult to draw a direct line of causality between 
juvenile delinquency and the viewing of motion pictures. (This nuance was quickly 
thrown aside in popular press.) That some of the studies contained correlational data 
about viewing movies and general anti-social behavior was all that was needed to inflame 
popular anxieties about newer media and its effects.  These studies received much 
attention and were often selectively quoted in what was basically a populist attack on the 
motion picture industry for its perceived corruption of youth.
55
    
 Note here that the Payne Fund studies were archetypal of Carey’s anxiety model 
communications research. Thus, the historical importance of the Payne Fund studies 
stems from their relationship to the society more so than their analysis of it.  These 
studies reflected in themselves the popular angst towards newer media contained in the 
larger society in which they took place; they are prime examples of “therapy” for these 
popular fears about new media. In this way, the Payne Fund studies were an early 
academic response to anxieties about the impact of mass media, much like the research 
done on the effects of violent television shows on children done more today.
56
 Carey’s 
Kuhnian observation about the importance of social context in the production of social 
research helps explain these studies, and should inform our conception of such studies 
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today.             
 As Carey observed, the anxiety over media effects on children is one of the only 
remaining forms of the “strong-effects” theory in modern media effects research; this is 
because children are believed to be more vulnerable to the media to which they are 
exposed. On the other hand, the “hypodermic needle” or “strong-effects” theory of an all-
powerful media has generally faded out of fashion, only to be revived occasionally for 
various forms of ideological hand wringing. Fully-grown adults are seen to be capable of 
discerning between media that are harmful or mendacious and media that are not. 
According to the “limited effects” model, more or less established by researchers like 
Paul Lazarsfeld and Joseph Klapper beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, adults are 
protected from the harmful effects of mass media by numerous mediating factors. Some 
of these protective mediating factors are personal psychology, meaning that people seek 
out media to fulfill personal interest and desires, and some are social, meaning that 
people assign meanings to mass media according to the social groups to which they 
belonged.
57
   
In the standard view of the intellectual history of mass communications, the shift 
from the “strong effects” theory to a more “limited effects” theory essentially ruled out 
the fears of propaganda for producing dangerous extremism en masse. One of the most 
well-known studies completed during this period that challenged the popular notion of an 
all-powerful mass media, and led to the “limited-effects” theories more or less dominant 
today, was published in 1944 by “arch-quantifier” Paul L. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, 
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Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, called The People’s Choice.
58
 This study relied on 
interviews with approximately six hundred respondents to determine the level of 
influence campaign messages had on voters during a presidential election. What the study 
found has already been discussed, namely that personal relationships were very important 
in the political decisions of individuals. That this rather prosaic finding was found to be 
interesting is revealing of the intellectual climate in which it was done and the popular 
notions about media that existed; this study reaffirmed the good sense of the American 
public and implicitly congratulated the functioning of American liberal democracy. It 
also pushed academic discussions about what the media ought to be, towards positivist 
discussions about what it is.          
 In the postwar years, the limited effects model firmly took hold and as Carey put 
it “the research tradition [became] largely a mopping up operation: the closer and more 
detailed specification of the specific operation of mediating and intervening factors.”
59
 
While Carey’s articulation of the path this research tradition took was basically 
caricature, there was much truth in it. What happened to the media effects tradition after 
the end of WWII and into the 1950s and beyond became a relatively uninteresting debate 
about media effects, with no firm answers, and no grand theories or explanations. 
Bernard Berelson, the distinguished mass communications scholar who was a co-author 
of the study with Lazarsfeld and Gaudet that introduced the limited effects theoretical 
perspective, famously reached a breaking point in 1959 and publically announced that the 
field was going nowhere: “We are on a plateau of research development, and have been 
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 Despite Berelson’s announcement, however, the research has continued.  Within 
the discipline, debates as to questions about the media’s effects became locked between 
oscillating views of a minimal-effects-theory of media,
61
 and a not-so-minimal effects 
theory.
62
 That is to say, scholars have varied significantly in their positions about the 
level of impact of the media’s messages over the past fifty years of communications 
research regardless of the increasingly complex and abstruse methods and statistical 
models used. The trend of minimal-effects-theory sees media messages as having 
negotiated meanings within minds of their audience. The not-so-minimal effects school 
of theory, on the other hand, view the media as having a more powerful influence than 
the minimal-school might assert, and the debate continues to this day.
63
  
 Given the effects research tradition’s inertia, Carey, in characteristic fashion, 
diagnosed the situation in this way: “[u]nder these circumstances, we can continue to wait 
for our Newton to arise within the traditional framework, but that increasingly feels like 
waiting for Godot.”
64
 A Newton of communications has never arrived, but the reasons for 
the institutionalization of the effects tradition and how it was cemented and expanded had 
nothing to do with its intellectual success or failure. The research institutions and 
                                                          
60
 Bernard Berelson, “Forum: The State of Communications Research,” Public Opinion Quarterly 23, no. 1 
(1959): 6.  
 
61
 For a full description of the limited effects theory, see Joesph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass 
Communication (New York: Free Press, 1960).  
 
62
 E.g. Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, “Return to the Concept of a Powerful Mass Media,” Studies of 
Broadcasting 9 (1973): 67-112.  
 
63
 For an interesting overview of this debate from an internal perspective see W. Russell Neuman and 
Lauren Guggenheim, “The Evolution of Media Effects Theory: A Six-Stage Model of Cumulative 
Research,” Communications Theory 21, no. 2 (2011): 169-196.  
 
64
 Carey, “Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies,” in Communication as Culture, 71.  
 
 32 
methodological commitments of American sociologists and mass communications 
scholars have stemmed from an American intellectual culture dedicated to “scientism” 
and “positivism.” These commitments are in one sense the product of intellectual culture, 
but in another sense they were the product of purely political circumstances that came out 
the Cold War.  
The Cold War and Positivist Social Science 
The type of positivist research that Carey railed against in the 1960s and 1970s 
had been greatly expanded by state prerogatives and underlying political realities; the 
positivist social scientific paradigm in mass communications and other disciplines owes 
much if its prestige to the legacy of the Cold War.  According to social science historian 
Theodore Porter, the postwar period from 1945 to the late 1960s saw the social sciences 
becoming closely intertwined with the pragmatic and ideological requirements of the 
Cold War. Porter maintains that the effects of McCarthyism did not so much politicize 
the academy as depoliticize it. The Cold War provided incentive for social scientists of 
all shades to focus on the technical tools of science, the practical application of statistics, 
and the embrace of neutrality and detachment as distinct from the more value based, 
morally engaged, and subjective analysis of earlier forms of social inquiry. Of course, this 
form of academic depoliticization was itself political; avoidance of political issues 
completely is one form of status-quo conservatism. Because of their insistence on 
independence and their preoccupation with neutral objectivity, a large number of Cold 
War social scientists disavowed the values and interests that shaped the production of 
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social knowledge in the first place.
65
          
 The Cold War period saw the social sciences in the United States reach 
unprecedented levels of prestige and expansion; the relevance of “scientific” or 
systematic planning for the purposes of national security had been growing in importance 
since WWII. Porter and Carey both held that one cannot view the intellectual currents in 
the social sciences during this period as independent from the interests and influence of 
the state and the society. As a temporal backdrop for the overarching influences in the 
social sciences generally, the Cold War provides a useful lens for inquiry into the 
intellectual development of professional social research and the study of mass 
communications, particularly for a generation of scholars of which Carey was a part.
66
 
But there is more to the story.        
 The politically expedient forms of ideological obfuscation among academics 
during the Cold War do not explain entirely the rise and influence of neutral, “value-free” 
quantitative social science, which includes the field of mass communications. The 
explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 signaled the power of the scientific 
method in altering the material world; and from this power the idealization of the 
scientific method as a model for all intellectual endeavors to follow in the post-war 
period in the United States became institutionalized and cemented. This idealization, 
added to the establishment of social scientists as an eminent professionalized class, 
encouraged their desire to win for themselves prestige and influence among public and 
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government administrators. This desire led them to even further embrace and advocate 
objectivity.
67
 Therefore, the “effects tradition” drew its values of scientific objectivity 
from historically and culturally contingent conditions in the United States. Carey’s 
advocacy that we “talk less about rigor [in research] and more about originality” was both 
a brave and intellectually necessary prescription for new approaches to the study of 
media and communications.
68
 By the time Carey became a professor of communications 
in the journalism department at the University of Illinois in 1963, the positivism within 
his discipline was well entrenched, and it was not long before Carey began to outline an 
alternative.           
 As philosopher and biologist Richard Lewontin noted, “[s]tudies of human 
society become ‘social sciences’ with an apparatus of investigation and statistical 
analysis that pretends that the process of investigation is not itself a social process.”
69
 
Carey understood this point well, as he formulated the same idea in his essay 
“Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies.” In this essay, he suggested that the search 
for “a positive science of communication, one that elucidates the laws of human behavior 
and the universal and univocal functions of the mass media,” should be abandoned for a 
more interpretive approach that includes both historical and cultural investigations.
70
 
 The fact that a “science of society” has never been established, that the Newton of 
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communications has never appeared, would not have surprised John Dewey, who was 
telling us in 1927 many of the same things that Carey told us in the 1970s. As Dewey put 
it,  
The prestige of the mathematical and physical sciences is great, and properly so. 
But the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human 
desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of 
human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be 
rid of by any methodology. The more sincerely we appeal to facts, the greater is 
the importance of the distinction between facts which condition human activity 
and facts which are conditioned by human activity. In the degree which we ignore 
this difference, social science becomes pseudo-science.
71
   
Here, Dewey gives us the justification for the type of historical, interpretive, cultural 
investigations that Carey advocated. A simpler way to express Dewey’s idea is that there 
is an intrinsic difference between a blink and a wink. This example was made well-
known by Clifford Geertz, who borrowed it from the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle 
(the philosopher who also provided Geertz with his famous method of “thick 
description”).
72
 A blink is the result of a physiological process that can be explained in 
terms of causal processes independent of “human desire and endeavor.” But a wink is no 
such process. A wink cannot be understood in terms of causal relations but rather must be 
classified as a practice; in Carey’s terms, a wink’s meaning must be culturally diagnosed 
and understood. In other words, a blink can be explained, a wink must be interpreted.
73
 
 Nevertheless, a full discussion of Carey’s opposition to the implicit behaviorism 
and explicit positivism in his discipline must include one very important caveat to his 
                                                          
71
 Dewey, The Public and its Problems, 7.  
 
72
 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation 
of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 6. 
 
73
 See Neil Postman “Social Science as Moral Theology,” in Conscientious Objections (New York: Vintage 




admonishment of these research traditions. In terms of the “media effects” research and 
its associated positivism outlined thus far (by which I mean a commitment to 
methodological rigor adopted from the natural sciences, statistical reasoning, and a 
reliance on quantifiable data), it is not simply the case that the production of this social 
data is merely an ideological predilection towards scientism that has no practical 
application. Even Carey, in his more ecumenical moments, acknowledged that 
methodological rigor in the production of quantified social data had its place. To this 
point he wrote, “[t]o abandon the effects tradition does not entail doing away with 
research methods, including the higher and more arcane forms of counting, that take up 
so much time in our seminars…[n]o one, except the congenitally out of touch, suggests 
we have to stop counting…”
74
 This point is obvious but necessary to make.  
 For example, the unemployment rate, to give one example, is the result of a 
survey and its importance as a metric for social well-being is difficult to overstate. Of 
course, such labor statistics are rooted in a progressive history that had a telos for the 
improvement of society, not for establishing a disinterested science of it. Yet the ability 
for a population to point to basic quantitative facts about itself is essential to the political 
functioning of a modern society. No one, except “the congenitally out of touch,” would 
argue that proper methods for obtaining facts, as accurate as possible, are important 
because the alleviation of social ills requires information to guide progressive action 
towards effective solutions. The problem arises when quantifiable answers begin to be 
given to purely qualitative questions, or worse, when larger social questions concerning 
culture, history, and the like are simply ignored in order to focus on small scale problems 
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that are more congenial to standardized methods.       
 Indeed, the effect of these methodological commitments has led to a rather 
impoverished view of the term “empirical” in the social sciences, which has limited it to 
meaning only the abstracted statistical data about individuals as conceived by researchers. 
Empiricism means to learn from experience, to reach conclusions only after viewing 
relevant evidence, and in this way a historian looking at the diary of a president is no less 
“empirical” than a sociologist examining the outcomes of a survey.
75
 What must be 
emphasized is that such empirical observations of either the historian or the sociologist 
are tied, whether implicitly or explicitly, to human “desires and endeavors” regardless of 
their empirical merit. But the questions remains: “If not a science of society, then what?” 
In the following chapter I will investigate the “cultural turn” in communications research 
that Carey advocated and what he meant with the vague term “cultural studies” as his 
alternative to the positivist effects tradition in mass communications.  
  
                                                          
75
 On the curious use of the word “empirical” in American Social Science, see discussion in Postman, 







A CULTURAL APPROACH: TRANSMISSION AND RITUAL 
As the story goes, Carey began to advocate for a cultural turn in mass 
communications scholarship in the early 1960s. By the 1960s, the positivist and 
behaviorist paradigms in the social sciences writ large were coming under attack from a 
variety of directions. Even in the natural sciences, the post-positivist movement, as 
exemplified by Thomas Kuhn, Larry Laudan, Paul Feyerbend, and others, was successful 
in dismantling the positivist notion of the internal logic of “pure science” (the honorific 
name for physics) that saw science as a naturally progressing process of constantly 
improving methods and knowledge of exact reality. The political and cultural turmoil of 
the decade spelled even more trouble for the social sciences, including mass 
communications, as the standard cookbook of sociological methods taken from the 
natural sciences came under scrutiny for its apparent reductionism and inadequacies in 
confronting what were inherently political issues.      
 Of course, what are now fashionably called qualitative methods have long had 
their place in the history of what may more broadly be described as social inquiry. But 
the dominance of quantitative methodologies in mass communications, and elsewhere, 
has emerged because science and quantification have played a unique role in American 
culture to a degree not encountered elsewhere.
76
 Yet, faced with the emerging challenge 
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by qualitative and more interpretative methods that dealt explicitly with more overtly 
political issues, the knowledge monopolies of positivist and behaviorist modes of inquiry 
slowly gave way to alternative forms.
77
 This qualitative challenge was the result of a 
long-standing academic dispute, of course, between literary-minded social critics and 
quantitative social scientists, but it finally exploded as the result of changing political 
realties outside of the academy. In journalism and mass communications, this dispute was 
present in the early stages of the discipline and was epitomized by the very short-lived 
collaboration between the quantitative researcher Paul Lazarsfeld and critical theorist 
Theodore Adorno.
78
 But qualitative research became more viable as American political 
turmoil made larger political and cultural questions more cultural resonant and seemingly 
necessary.  During the era of the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War, 
institutional self-introspection became more feasible as the fantasies of domestic Cold 
War tranquility of the 1950s faded and American society came face-to-face with its own 
hypocrisies and downfalls.         
 As American political culture transformed and the social sciences began to shift 
their epistemological positions under the weight of internal criticism, these shifts were 
accompanied by an increase in the reach of popular culture. The success of Keynesian 
economics and the postwar boom gave way to a newfound prosperity for a generation of 
baby boomers. The forms of consumer culture that had taken shape during the “roaring 
twenties” thus became more accessible to younger Americans with more disposable 
income. The significance of popular culture increased in tandem with consumerism as 
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younger generations began to define themselves increasingly by their tastes in music, 
movies, and television.
79
 Naturally, this increased importance of popular culture in 
national life attracted interest on behalf of academics witnessing these transformations, 
especially for scholars of media.
80
        
 As Lawrence Grossberg has observed, in North America cultural studies began to 
show up in communications and education classrooms even before it appeared in those of 
anthropology, literature, or American studies.
81
 The confluence of changes in the 
American political and cultural environments that led to the aforementioned academic 
“cultural turn” opened the doors for academic studies into American popular culture with 
the critical methods used to analyze the western literary canon. Cultural studies in the 
American context saw the field grow tremendously from the 1960s onward, and in the 
field of mass communications, it was Carey who was one of the academics most credited 
for the North American flavor of cultural studies that found its way into communications 
and media studies classrooms in the U.S.   
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A Decidedly  “Ethnocentric” View: Carey and North American Cultural Studies  
Carey took inspiration from a wide variety of scholars, including the work of 
British academics such as Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart, members of the 
Chicago School of Sociology such as John Dewey, Robert Park, and Charles Cooley, as 
well as the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, to name a few. His idea was to 
create a multi-disciplinary approach to what was by its nature a very large, if not vague, 
topic. In an interview published in 2006, Carey described what he meant in his original 
proposal for the creation of cultural studies: 
Cultural Studies was then little more than a term to describe the perceived 
commonalities in the work of Joe Gusfield, Jay Jensen, Erving Goffman, Thomas 
Kuhn, symbolic interactionism and the Chicago School of Sociology, Kenneth 
Burke, Leslie Fiedler and a small group of literary critics, and, of course, Marshall 
McLuhan and Harold Innis, along with those Marxists willing to associate with a 
group largely affiliated in opposition to positivism and positive science. This was 
a strange group to patch together, against their will if they know about it, but 




The group he wanted to patch together was so large and diverse, representing such a vast 
area of inquiry and theoretical perspectives that it threatened to dissolve the boundaries of 
Carey’s discipline completely. But given Carey’s views about academic boundaries in the 
first place, he would most likely have greeted such criticism with a shrug. Carey’s move 
in the beginning was explicitly tactical; his picking of a such a general term, “Cultural 
Studies,” for his program of study was meant to be as all encompassing as possible in 
order to mount a successful attack on positive social science.    
 As Carey recalled in a reflective essay published in 1997, his chosen name for his 
approach, “cultural studies,” was meant to seem “innocent”; he meant that, in the 
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beginning, at least, he had no definite program in mind and was attracted to the 
impartiality of the term. The name was an allusion to Max Weber’s “cultural science,” 
but of course the word “science” had little appeal to Carey. Carey chose “cultural 
studies” instead of “cultural science” because he did not want to pick a word that had 
already been taken by those he wished to contest. So “cultural studies” became his term 
for a very speculative enterprise. It was speculative because, at first, Carey had only one 
real goal: to shift the direction of the discipline of journalism and mass 
communications.
83
          
 Carey began forming his conception of cultural studies by reading the “usual 
suspects,” members of what came to be the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at 
the University of Birmingham, founded by Richard Hoggart and his colleagues in 1964. 
One of the founding texts of this uniquely British cultural approach was Hoggart’s The 
Uses of Literacy published in 1957, a semi-autographical work that examined the role the 
contemporary popular literature of the working class in England in its forming a culture 
and a working class identity. The book was a break from traditional literary studies of 
“high culture.” Hoggart demonstrated that there was an authentic working class culture 
that deserved academic attention. One of the major topics of this now classic text was 
how a more authentic working class literary culture came to be threatened by an invading 
American popular culture. Hoggart’s approach was significant because his analysis broke 
away from traditional left wing accounts (Hoggart called these accounts “middle class 
Marxist” interpretations) of the working class that either pitied or patronized them. 
Hoggart’s self-reflection on his relationship to his subjects was a marked aspect of his 
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brand of cultural studies that one also sees in Carey’s work.
84
    
 Carey admired very much Hoggart and his Centre’s approach, beginning with its 
avoidance of the term “mass communication” to identify its scholarly subjects. In his 
essay “Mass Communications and Cultural Studies,” originally published in 1977, Carey 
gave a lengthy exposition on the reasons that Raymond Williams, and by extension he 
himself, avoided the term mass communication in an attempt to refocus their attention on 
the broader topic of media and culture. Williams avoided the term because it was too 
specialized towards mass media like broadcast television, film, and popular literature, all 
of which were communications that come from a very specific modern and commercial 
context, and avoided the common realms of speech and writing. Besides this narrow 
focus, the use of the word “mass,” most importantly for Carey, limited the questions that 
could be put towards these topics of media and culture.
85
 As Carey put it, “because the 
audience was a mass, the only question worth asking was how, and then whether, film, 
television, or books influenced or corrupted people.”
86
      
 Yet for all of the influence that British cultural studies had on Carey’s thinking, 
Carey was determined that his version of cultural studies have a distinctive North 
American foundation. His argument for this “ethnocentrism” was straightforward. For 
Carey, the work of scholars like Marx, Weber, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and 
Richard Hoggart came from a distinctive time, national formation, and cultural context, a 
context in which they were embedded and, for Carey, had to be understood. In Carey’s 
approximation, it was the “ethnocentrism” of Hoggart and Williams – or rather, that their 
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work was embedded in, and acknowledging of, a local cultural context  – that added to 
the strength of their claims. This characteristic of their scholarship allowed them to adjust 
to local circumstances.
87
          
 Carey never changed in his position that an effective cultural study must begin its 
investigation with an appreciation of the cultural uniqueness of the nation state in 
question. To this point, Carey wrote that “the natural home of cultural studies, at least 
within ‘developed cultures,’ is the nation state.”
88
 This was not nationalism but more or 
less common sense. That nations differ in natural resources, theology, cultural attitudes, 
and political circumstances is obvious. Carey, for example, citied the “tragic situation of 
African Americans” in the United States, a claim that needs no review here, as one of the 
many unique aspects of American culture that must be taken into account should one seek 
to understand the culture’s predicament.
89
 To examine culture, then, one must begin with 
the acknowledgment that the situation is both complex and difficult to generalize, and 
that it is typically a localized phenomenon contingent on local understandings and 
practice.           
 This “ethnocentrism” led Carey to turn to North American thinkers to begin 
building an American version of cultural studies akin to Hoggart’s Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies. This point of view led him to unearth elements from the 
famous University of Chicago’s school of sociology as he searched for a distinctly North 
American starting point. As discussed in the previous chapter, Carey’s alternative history 
of communications research inserted the “Chicago School of Sociology” (Carey’s 
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reference to the work of Dewey, Park, and Cooley) as the genesis of a more complete 
version of the history of research into media and society. The so-called “Chicago School” 
and its symbolic interactionism, including a considerable influence from the work of John 
Dewey, provided the backbone for Carey’s version of cultural studies that he wished to 
be carried forward.          
 Indeed, Carey’s own critical analysis of American journalism was a throw back to 
a unique blend of pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, and historical criticism that was 
indebted to the work of Chicago School pragmatists like George Herbert Mead in the first 
part of the twentieth century. Symbolic interactionism views human beings as uniquely 
capable of creating, manipulating, and interpreting symbols in order to communicate 
what are complex ideas of culture and history. Within this theory, humans are seen as 
necessarily interactive; there is no solitary self because the self’s formation takes place in 
relation to others and exterior systems of symbols. Erving Goffman, for instance, 
examined the seemingly simple process of an individual walking into a room of others, 
and concluded that the intricate processes of impression management involved on behalf 
of the person walking into the room and the others looking on him gave the “self” a fluid, 
complicated, and dialectic character contingent on social circumstances.
90
   
 Accepting of this a priori notion of the interactionist self, Carey’s critique of 
contemporary journalistic practices, for example, stemmed from his theoretical 
standpoint that a stable society must exist in a comprehensible symbolic environment. As 
Carey understood it, journalists were “active participants” in the creation of this symbolic 
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reality who were nevertheless frequent victims of the forces around them rather than 
being the steady stalwarts of the public interest, as they commonly believed. Carey’s 
critique of the contemporary situation was that American journalism had evolved, for 
various reasons both ideological and institutional, to a state limited to the transmission of 
incoherent, ephemeral, and disconnected information. Carey described this ephemeral 
information environment nicely when he wrote that “everything seems to have the life 
span of a butterfly in spring.”
91
 Given this situation, American journalism increasingly 
did not provide coherent explanations or narrative detail necessary to provide an 
individual with an accurate sense of the political and cultural world that surrounds him, 
or address the persistent structural realties of class, race, and gender that are always 
lurking beneath the news of the day.
92
 Therefore, such a problem becomes salient when 
one acknowledges the necessity of interaction with one’s symbolic environment with 
one’s formation of the self.         
 In addition to his indebtedness to the Chicago School and its symbolic 
interactionism, Carey drew much from cultural anthropology. The next most important 
source of inspiration for Carey’s cultural studies was Clifford Geertz. Geertz, a cultural 
anthropologist, was one of the strongest voices in Carey’s essays along with John Dewey 
and Harold Innis. Geertz’s methods drew from the Weberian verstehen tradition (a 
German word that translates loosely to understanding), which sought meaning through 
interpretation and empathy. Geertz, in a comment Carey was fond of quoting, used a 
metaphor to explain what this process of interpretation involved. As Geertz put it, “man 
is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.” Geertz took 
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“culture to be those webs.”
93
 And his goal was to search for meaning in these cultural 
webs and interpret the processes within them, or, as he put it, “[i]t is explication that I am 
after, construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical.”
94
  
 Following Geertz, Carey’s methods for analyzing culture also borrowed heavily 
from the verstehen tradition and also from Geertz’s well-known technique of “thick 
description.” Geertz wrote, “[Alfred North] Whitehead once offered to the natural 
sciences the maxim ‘Seek simplicity and distrust it’; to the social sciences he might well 
have offered ‘Seek complexity and order it.’”
95
 In much of his work, Carey took this 
advice. Carey’s cultural approach to media and communications sought an understanding 
of the complex web of human communications that was both historically grounded and 
interpretive. Carey was not a historian of course, he was a philosophically minded 
essayist that incorporated an eclectic synthesis of academic literature in his own 
scholarship that appreciated and even took delight in the complexity of culture.  
 Much of Carey’s brand of American cultural studies involved what Neil Postman 
and Charles Weingartner called the “anthropological perspective,” which “allows one to 
be a part of his own culture and, at the same time, to be out of it.”
96
 Richard Hoggart’s 
The Uses of Literacy, for example, was written from this point of view in that it analyzed 
working class culture empathically on its own terms. In Carey’s discussion of cultural 
studies, this perspective was implicitly the point of view that underlined the methods and 
processes that Carey felt an investigator into society, culture, and its media should take. 
                                                          
93
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5. 
 
94
 Ibid.  
 
95
 Ibid., 34.  
 
96
 Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, Teaching as a Subversive Activity (New York: Dell Publishing 
Co., 1969), 4. 
 
 48 
This anthropological perspective, or rather ability to remove oneself enough from the 
surrounding culture in order to see it more clearly, provided the lens through which Carey 
viewed the intellectual history of the discipline of mass communications. The dialogic 
character of Carey’s work––it was both critically introspective and engaging––provides a 
good example of the type of positionality that an observer should take when searching for 
cultural meanings when surrounded by that very culture. For example, Carey’s essays on 
the “effects tradition” were written by a scholar that took his very discipline as his subject 
and engaged in an empathetic conversation on methods and ways of knowing much the 
same way an anthropologist like Geertz looked on a cockfight, that is, both from within 
and from outside of it.        
 Although, if searching for meaning and understanding sounds rather vague, 
without predetermined steps or methods for inquiry, this is because this is largely the 
case; as Carey put it, cultural studies has “far more modest objectives than other 
traditions. It does not seek to explain human behavior in terms of the laws that govern it 
or to dissolve it in the structures that underlie it; rather, it seeks to understand it.”
97
 This 
was a distinctly interpretative enterprise. Understanding is much different from the goal 
of behavior modification or a search for natural laws; there are no experiments that can 
be performed on a culture in order to diagnose it, as Carey put it.
98
 Interpretation is more 
of an artful process, and one that must necessarily rely on a liberal arts education in 
literature, philosophy and, history to be successful. In this way, Carey was attempting to 
shift the ground on which the conversation about methodology in the social sciences was 
taking place.  
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 However, Carey did not leave his readers without an example as to how an 
investigation in cultural studies might proceed. His well-known discussion of an ersatz 
conversation about death served as his most trenchant example of the use of the verstehen 
tradition. Carey asked his reader to imagine a conversation between four people about the 
nature of death and when it takes place. First, Carey gave us the example of the 
contemporary physician who determined that death took place as soon as the brain waves 
ceased. Then, there was the typical middle American who argued that death occurred 
when the heart stopped beating. Then there was the Irish peasant who argued with the 
former two that death did not occur until three days after the cessation of the heartbeat, 
when the person had been completely removed from the community. And finally, there 
was the tribal mountain man who said that death occurred seven days before the cessation 
of the heartbeat, right at the moment food could not be found.
99
   
 Carey’s point was to challenge his readers to think critically and expansively 
about the problems of interpreting human phenomenon. The point was to first “undress” 
the scene or “text,” that is, to remove the words and read the actions of how the death was 
assessed (the measuring of the brain waves or heartbeat) as a text. The point was to treat 
the phenomenon as a collection of symbolic actions, in order to understand what was 
taking place. If the peasant did not believe that death had occurred until the body was 
carried away, the point was not to find a causal variable for his mistaken belief but to 
interpret the setting and context of his belief and then to understand it by engaging it.
 A fuller example of such understanding and interpretation can be found in 
Geertz’s famous analysis of a Balinese cockfight. Consider the following analysis: 
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What sets the cockfight apart from the ordinary course of life, lifts it from the 
realm of everyday practical affairs, and surrounds it with an aura of enlarged 
importance is not, as functionalist sociology would have it, that it reinforces status 
discriminations (such reinforcement is hardly necessary in a society where every 
act proclaims them), but that it provides a metasocial commentary upon the whole 
matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then 
organizing the major part of the collective existence around that assortment. Its 
function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese reading of 
Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves.
100
 
This purely interpretive analysis of the meaning of the Balinese cockfight situated it 
within a social context and explained it without reducing it to a cause and effect analysis. 
In addition, notice that it explicitly avoids the functionalist sociological analysis of the 
type that would have emphasized the role of the cockfight in forming a consensus for the 
proper functioning of the larger community. This nuanced analysis showcases Geertz’s 
method of interpreting the meaning of the cultural practice “as a story they [the Balinese] 
tell themselves about themselves,” in this case a cockfight, by finding the underlying 
meaning of the practice at first not visible through mere observation, but made visible by 
contemplation and interpretation.  
The Transmission/Ritual Views of Communications 
The most well-known concept of Carey’s unique brand of cultural studies was of 
course his famous ritual/transmission binary. This binary is an overall theme for his 
cultural media analysis and embodied his analysis of the way media systems, technology, 
and content were conceived in the U.S. Contained within this binary is both criticism of 
the transmission model of communications research and advocacy of an alternative path 
in the ritual model of communications research. Carey’s ritual view is marked by a 
unique intellectual optimism.        
                                                          
100
 Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in The Interpretation of Cultures, 448.  
 
 51 
 For Carey, the lived reality of a community was a mutually formed creation by 
individual actors in conversation with one another.
101
 This “ritual view of 
communication” celebrates the fact that social reality is created within the symbolic 
interaction of a community. Carey’s friend and student Lawrence Grossberg aptly 
described the ritual view in this way: “[t]he concept of ritual communication drew upon 
the common roots of communication, community and communion, to explore the ways 
communication constituted symbolic reality but also defined common ways of living and 
participating in that reality with others.”
102
 One can see here the clear relationship 
between Carey’s ritual view and that of the symbolic interactionism of the Chicago 
School. To demonstrate how a ritual view of communication might inform the actual 
analysis of communication, Carey offered the problem of studying newspaper reading:  
A ritual view of communication will focus on a different range of problems in 
examining a newspaper. It will, for example, view reading a newspaper less as 
sending or gaining information and more as attending a mass, a situation in which 




 In other words, human communication, in this case, reading a newspaper, is a habitual 
and ritualistic practice that both proscribes and establishes the conditions of lived reality--
i.e., the shared social, cultural, and political meaning among its members. According to 
Carey, the newspaper gives its audiences confirmation about the social world rather than 
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supplying them with a false consciousness from which they must escape. For Carey, the 
news is not information but drama, habitually consumed and negotiated.  
Within the ritual view of communications, Carey emphasizes the importance of 
community, participation, communion, and conversation for societal maintenance and 
replication. Much of Carey’s work thus seems to embody Dewey’s nostalgia for and 
idealism about the small town, middle class community. Absent from Carey’s ritual view 
is the language of power and domination found in much of the critical literature in mass 
communications regarding the United States, its culture, and its media. Carey favored the 
insights and optimism found in Dewey over the emphasis on conflict and exploitation 
found in Marx.        
 Although Carey was criticized for not properly addressing issues of power in his 
cultural approach to media studies, he understood that power plays an important role in 
any study of the mass media, even though many of these issues faded quickly into the 
background in much of his own work. Nevertheless, he argued, for example, that in 
matters concerning interpersonal communications, the political is less salient and easily 
avoided, but that this is “[n]ot so with the mass media, where questions of political power 
and institutional change are inescapable and usually render hopelessly ineffective the 
standard cookbook recipes retailed by the graduate schools.”
104
 These “recipes” were the 
standard quantitative methods taught in the effects tradition, which Carey was well aware 
avoided integral questions about institutions and politics.      
 A careful reader might see in Carey’s original essay that formulated the ritual 
view the intellectual lineage of the ideals of Deweyan participatory democracy. Dewey 
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believed that democracy ethically obligates its members to promote and establish 
communities where resources are available for all individuals to realize their full 
capacities and where all are afforded the opportunity to bring these capacities to fruition 
through active participation in political and cultural life.
105
 The need for an individual’s 
active participation in political, social, and cultural life is axiomatic in Carey’s ritual view 
of communication and thus his view of an ethical democracy. Within the ritual view, to 
begin an analysis of communication with an emphasis on ritual and community is to 
privilege, in Carey’s words, “the oral formation of culture” rather than “technological 
forms of transmission.”
106
 In other words, Carey used a conversation as a metaphor for 
the ethical principles of a democratic community that are realized by the active and equal 
participation of the public in conversation with one another. According to John Dewey, 
this participation, based in communal life with an active acknowledgement of others, 
provides “[t]he clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, [that] 
constitutes the idea of democracy.”
107
      
 In later work, Carey acknowledged that the ritual view of communication was 
mainly his response to a conceptualization of communications within the behavioral 
sciences “as a form of transmission for the pursuit of power (influence was what it was 
called) or the release of anxiety.”
108
 Carey asserted famously that the transmission view 
of communication had dominated intellectual approaches to mass communications in the 
postwar United States. Within Carey’s binary, the view of communications as a social 
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ritual is in dialectical opposition to its transmission counterpart; where the ritual view 
sees communications as social maintenance and creation, the transmission view sees it as 
social management and conquest over geography.      
 With an emphasis on spatiality, temporality, and their conquest and management, 
the transmission view of communication concentrates efforts on the efficient transport of 
messages and information over a vast geography for the purposes of persuasion, 
socialization, and behavior modification. This view of communication is congruous with 
a vertically integrated communications system, in which elite opinions are broadcast for 
consumption by a mass public and the progress of the country can be measured 
empirically by opinions that are thus successfully managed. Intellectually, the 
transmission view concerns itself with research that focuses on the effects that messages 
have on the receiver—for example, the “effects tradition” of mass communications 
research. This form of effects research, embodied in the positivist, quantitative research 
model in mass communications, owes much to the legacy of Paul Lazarsfeld whose work 
pulled communications into the realm of psychology more than any other.
109
 Carey’s 
work wanted to make central a more empathetic process research, even if to more jaded 
readers his advocacy of a more democratic community may seem quixotic in the face of 
sustained attacks by neo-liberal forms of capitalist development on such communities.  
Carey, Cultural Studies, and Power 
 As might be obvious by now from my discussion of Carey’s brand of cultural 
studies, the type of research that Carey wrote himself and advocated for was not 
explicitly political. Unlike much of the work done in a more leftist tradition from the 
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likes of Stuart Hall and others at the Centre of Contemporary Culture, and much of the 
work done from continental thinkers like Foucault and Althusser, Carey essentially 
wanted to avoid a cultural studies that could be clearly identified as coming from an 
explicit political ideology. Throughout much of his life, Carey viewed Marxism and work 
in political economy in general with a constant skepticism. This skepticism was the result 
of a number of factors, some personal and some intellectual.   
 This is not to say that Carey disdained work in the Marxist tradition. He was no 
friend to neoliberal forms of capitalism and the effects of the privatization of media on 
the democratic forms of dialogue he admired.
110
 Carey was clearly a man of the Left if 
we must pick labels. His work was parallel with Innis, and others, in that it contained a 
critical point of view that admonished the imperial aspects of the economics of mass 
communications and the effects tradition of research. Yet Carey, for the most part, was 
careful to avoid traditional Marxist language and theoretical positions about ideological 
superstructures because he was uncomfortable making class or the issues of power 
relations in society the central point of analysis.     
 Therefore, for all Carey’s radical views towards positivist research traditions, his 
politics were not explicitly radical. Carey wanted to uphold many of the traditions of 
western liberalism and democratic community that many Marxists ignored or, in terms of 
western liberalism with its market economies, would have been content to let fade away. 
Carey admired the emphasis on community he found in Innis and Dewey, and he chose to 
focus his efforts on the possibility of a revival of democratic communities rather than on 
how they were being attacked. Carey’s real target for his cultural studies was positivism 
in the social sciences, not the asymmetrical power relations in his society.   
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 Carey’s personal reasons for his skepticism towards Marxism must be accounted 
for. But before these personal reasons are discussed, it is important to point out that 
reading the details of an author’s biography into that author’s work is always fraught with 
potential errors. To try to find elements of Carey’s biography in his theoretical positions 
risks simplifying his arguments and making connections that Carey would have never 
endorsed or intended. Nevertheless, Carey’s comments concerning his relationship to 
Marxism were revealing. They seem related, if only in a tentative way, to his more 
theoretical critiques of cultural studies that took inspiration from the Marxist and neo-
Marxist traditions.          
 The comments in question took place in an interview with Lawrence Grossberg in 
2006. Grossberg began his line of questioning by asking Carey if his relationship to 
Marxism was affected by former Marxist professors whom Carey did not remember 
fondly. In Carey’s view, these professors were perfectly willing to engage in fiery 
revolutionary rhetoric in academic circles while relying on others to go out and risk their 
bodies for these political ideals.
111
 While Carey acknowledged that his views on Marxism 
were certainly shaped by former Marxist professors, he suggested that the tension 
between himself, Marxism, and his theories of culture came from an early experience he 
had as child in terms of Marxism and religion. Carey recounted this experience in the 
following way: 
I’m really attributing a mature thought to an immature mind; I understand that. 
But, I know that the old IWW I came to admire later on, and my family admired, 
had the slogan that said ‘If you don’t come in on Sunday, don’t come in on 
Monday,’ meaning Sunday does not belong to the church but to the party. That 
was the attitude of the Communist party as well. And, like Stuart Hall much later, 
                                                          
111




I think that was a gross misunderstanding of the practical role religion at large 
played in people’s lives. Where to hold political meetings? We held them in the 
basement of the church. I mean, it was the only space available to us. I mean, they 
gave space to the Communist Party to come harangue us when they wished to do 
that. But, religion answered, in addition to metaphysical questions like what 
happens to me after I’m gone; it answered questions like: How do you bury the 
dead? How do you consecrate the ground?  How do you retain memory of people? 
These are practical questions when your grandparents are dying, and you have to 
ask, how are we going to do this? The CP had no answer for that.
112
 
 Carey went on to explain that his family members were not dogmatic, theological 
Catholics. Instead, he referred to his family as “ritual Catholics,” meaning that they found 
a certain level of satisfaction by participating in the rituals of their church and its 
organization.
113
 Carey and his family needed religious rituals to produce meaning and 
comfort during difficult times. There is nothing pedantic or theoretical to point out about 
such matters; Carey was merely pointing to a fact of ordinary life which religion was able 
affect positively. Marxism’s explicit dismissiveness of this practical application of 
religion made Carey suspicious of it throughout his career.    
 Carey, however, was not dismissive of Marxism, which is evident by the 
sophisticated criticism he leveled at it. Such criticisms could have only been produced by 
someone who confronted the claims of Marxism directly. In terms of his personal views, 
Carey’s religious background left him feeling that Marxism was without an adequate 
theory of religion and the purposes it served. As he became an academic, Carey’s views 
on religion were shaped greatly by Emile Durkheim and his book The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life. For his part, Durkheim took religion more seriously than Marx and 
considered it to be an important aspect of social maintenance, unlike in Marxism, where 
religion served merely as an opiate that numbed people to social conflict. Writing in 
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1915, Durkheim observed that “religious representations are collective representations 
which express collective realities.”
114
 This view of religion, as a collective expression of 
social meaning, permeated Carey’s ritual view of communication and informed his views 
of symbolic interactionism as well.       
 Carey’s critique of Marxism and media theorists that drew from political 
economic analysis was that these forms of analysis were reductionist; they reduced 
culture to ideology and analyzed society on purely economic foundations.  Carey 
believed that the analysis of economic Marxism and American political economists 
simply could not adjust to local circumstances because they attempted to view culture 
through the lens of economic laws that applied to both everyone and no one in particular; 
in this way, Carey’s critiques of Marxism paralleled his critique of the search for the 
natural laws of society in positivist social science.      
 Carey felt that the strength of American cultural studies overcame the limitations 
of political economic analysis because of its “ethnocentrism”: 
The strength of cultural studies, of the revolt against formalism and economistic 
Marxism, was precisely, I want to insist, this ethnocentrism. Intellectual work, 
including both cultural studies and political economy, is always and everywhere 
decisively touched and shaped by the national formation (along with class, race, 
gender, and so forth) within which it is produced…Nothing discredited Marxism 
more than its rigid inability to adapt to local circumstances, which meant in 
practice an inability to understand local knowledge whether of a religious, 
familial, aesthetic, or political sort.
115
 
In a deliberate attempt to show the importance of such local circumstances, Carey relied 
on no less of an authority than Karl Marx himself to point to the unique cultural situation 
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of the United States. Carey quoted Marx’s comment about the religious impulse in 
American life: “[t]he feverish youthful movement of material production, which has to 
make a new world of its own, has left neither time nor opportunity from abolishing the 
old world spirit.”
116
 As Carey pointed out, Marx expected this old world spirit to fade 
away, but of course, it never has. Carey used Marx to show contemporary Marxists that 
their analysis should take into account cultural aspects that even Marx himself 
understood.           
 Indeed, Carey had a point about the inflexibility of some of the Marxist inspired 
political economic analysis and about the problematic reduction of culture to ideology. 
Culture, for Carey, was much more than a false consciousness. Borrowing a metaphor for 
T.S. Eliot, Carey considered culture to be like a spiritual organism that could only be 
found in its specific context and not through an analysis of economic conditions.
117
  
Nevertheless, for all his analytic power, Carey essentially avoided all questions of power 
in its relationship to culture even though such questions are extremely important in our 
contemporary situation. The contemporary attack by the neoliberal right on the interests 
of the poor and the working class has taken place in the midst of one-sided class war 
from the top on the classes below, and these trends must be understood in terms of both 
political economy and culture.
118
 As Robert McChensey has pointed out, institutional 
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factors make the market the “mortal enemy” of the very concepts of community that 
Carey held in such high esteem. As McChesney put it, “[m]arkets encourage some of the 
worst traits of humanity and discourage some of our best traits, including selflessness and 
compassion.”
119
        
 Carey’s criticism of political economic analysis and its investigations of structural 
forms of inequality did not fully comprehend the fact that cultural forms, while 
important, are always already connected to material conditions and institutions. This is 
not to say that material conditions determine culture in total, but to neglect the role of 
power in American cultural studies is to miss a great deal of the interplay between 
structural forms of American capitalism and the more spiritual forms of culture that take 
place.            
 For example, in his well-known essay “The Problem of Journalism History” 
published in 1974, Carey rightly criticized the traditional versions of journalism history 
that celebrated the steady progression of technology across time and the great men of 
history who pushed the enterprise forward. Carey wanted to refocus the study of 
American journalism history on the “consciousness” that journalisms of the past analyzed 
and represented. Carey described a cultural history of journalism in this way: 
When we study the history of journalism we are principally studying a way in 
which people in the past have grasped reality. We are searching out the 
intersection of journalistic style and vocabulary, created systems of meaning, and 




This form of analysis was essentially Carey’s advocacy of a history from the bottom up, 
one that not only acknowledged the consciousness of the news creators but of the news 
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consumers. Carey’s critique of the state of journalism history did not go unnoticed, 
professional journalism historians responded to Carey’s call for a more cultural approach 
to journalism history and debated how to “operationalize” his ideas. Indeed, digging for 
the consciousness of a people is no easy task and Carey provided no concrete methods for 
doing so. Nevertheless, as historian Richard Schwarzlose observed, “each time James W. 
Carey turns his attention to the state of journalism history, his views stimulate, challenge, 
maybe even threaten us. Patron saint or pest, Carey cannot be ignored.”
121
     
 Carey’s call for a more cultural approach to journalism history, and studies of 
communications more generally, was certainly an admirable goal, especially considering 
the dismal state of journalism history that Carey was criticizing in the early 1970s. But as 
journalism historian David Paul Nord pointed out, such a study of cultural history was 
weak in its attention to power because, unfortunately, the messages of the media do not 
reach their audiences from the bottom up but from the opposite direction.
122
   
 It can be conceded that Carey’s anthropological notions of cultural studies, which 
included the symbolic interactionism of the Chicago School, continue to be a necessary 
form of analysis; the search for the consciousness of a people and an empathic 
understanding of their practices and relationship to mass media is a deeply humane goal. 
Nevertheless, Nord was correct in his observation that it would be a mistake to avoid the 
traditional analysis of institutional structures of media and their histories.  While Geertz 
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was right that man found himself entangled in webs of meaning he himself had spun, as 
Nord pointed out, this was only half of the story: “[t]he other part is that men and women 
are suspended in webs spun by others.”
123
      
 Therefore, while Carey’s push for a cultural understanding of social meaning was 
laudable, much of the “ethnocentric” forms of cultural studies he advocated were blind to 
larger institutional factors. While it is important not to diminish the agency of an 
audience in creating their own meanings through industrially produced products, there are 
still unavoidable institutional factors that go into their production and the messages that 
they contain. A political economic analysis shows the basis for material factors whose 
gravitational pull can distort even the most authentic culture. While Carey was right to 
seek out the meanings peoples attached to symbols, those symbols were still produced by 
those with more power than those below them.  
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JAMES CAREY AND TECHNOLOGY 
This final chapter will address Carey’s ideas about “technology and ideology.” 
Much of Carey’s concern with communications technology sprang from his interest in the 
work of Canadian academics Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis and their analysis of 
the various forms of communication media. Carey’s attention to technology and its 
relationship to political culture, education, and the larger society is a major theme in his 
scholarship. His work on technology included two important approaches: first a critical 
approach, most notably in essays with co-author John Quirk, in which they provide an 
iconoclastic critique of technology as an ideological category, what he and Quirk called 
the “electronic sublime.” With this critical approach to technology, they sought to expose 
the widespread belief that technology progresses naturally and independently towards 
improving the human condition as a harmful cultural mythos.
124
 Second, in his analysis 
of communications technology, like Innis before him, Carey focused on how the physical 
structure of a technology like the telegraph influenced its use and its effects on culture 
and journalism. With this materialist analysis, Carey focused his attention on historical 
changes in what Neil Postman called our “information environment,” the aggregate of 
communication technologies that make up our symbolic world.   
                                                          
124
 Carey and John J. Quirk, “The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution,” in Communication as Culture, 
103.    
 
 64 
 Inquiries into the “media environment” are attempts to observe how changes in 
that environment affect the ways we communicate and receive information. In his well-
known essay on the telegraph,
125
 Carey argued that the telegraph had “reworked the 
nature of written language and finally the nature of awareness itself”
126
 and shifted 
journalistic styles away from more long form, nuanced, and detailed news reporting in 
favor of the transmission of bits of information. Put another way, for Carey the 
introduction of the telegraph altered our information environment such that as the form 
and style of messages sent over vast distances changed, our awareness of the world 
changed along with it.  In this chapter, I will outline, critique, and classify the origins of 
Carey’s views on technology and how he integrated them in his specific brand of North 
American cultural studies.   
Innis, McLuhan, and Carey: The “Bias” of Technology 
Carey’s analysis of communications technology, specifically the telegraph, was 
rooted in a distinctly North American intellectual tradition sometimes called the Toronto 
School. This school of thought most commonly refers to the work of the Canadian 
scholars Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan. Of the two, Innis was the greater influence 
on Carey. Innis was a Canadian economist who became well known for his distinct brand 
of communications theory that focused on what he called the spatial or temporal medium 
“bias” in different communications technologies. This line of thought is sometimes 
referred to as “medium theory,” and it refers to the effect of a communication medium’s 
form on the information it presents, as well as a medium’s influence on political and 
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cultural organization. Understanding Innis’s work on communications technology is 
essential in understanding Carey’s own views on these topics. Not only did Carey write 
extensively on Innis and his work, but he also borrowed much from Innis’ language and 
theories in his own historical studies of the U.S. communications system. Of course, 
although Innis’ brand of communications theory provided much of the background for 
many of Carey’s ideas, there are also subtle differences that I will outline later in this 
chapter.           
 Innis’s theories and methods for investigating medium “biases” greatly impressed 
Carey. He wrote, “Innis’ work, despite its maddeningly obscure, opaque and elliptical 
character, is the great achievement in communications on this continent.”
127
 Carey felt 
that Innis had rescued communications research from becoming just another branch of 
social psychology condemned to rely on methods taken from the natural sciences.
128
 
Innis’ work, for Carey and others, represented an alternative route for inquiry that took 
the middle road between the dominant forms of socio-scientific and behaviorist research 
in mass communications in the U.S. and the postmodern forms of media and cultural 
studies in Europe.
129
         
 Writing of Innis’ style and methodology, Carey praised it as a break from the 
traditional scholarly style of linear presentation and precise argumentation with 
something that was an “apparently disconnected kaleidoscope of fact and information” 
that flashed before the reader a wide range of historical events separated by wide swaths 
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of time and geography.
130
 For Carey, such a wide ranging and seemingly fragmented 
style of argumentation allowed Innis “to capture the complexities of social existence and 
its multidimensional change.”
131
 This style, a kind of intellectual bombardment of facts 
and observation, can also be found in the “thick description” ethnographies of Clifford 
Geertz whose work was a heavily footnoted and interpretive analysis of events that 
occurred around him. The “thick descriptions” of Geertz and intellectual “kaleidoscopes” 
of Innis appealed to Carey’s literary sensibilities, in particular, his desire for detail and 
the acknowledgment of social questions resistant to quantitative answers and certain 
solutions.          
 But most importantly perhaps, Innis’ work represented for Carey a turning away 
from any pretense of a “value free” inquiry into human communications. Much of Innis’s 
work contained an implicit, at times explicit, critique of his own society. Innis, in other 
words, wrote from a point of view. Innis castigated the nature of North American 
imperialism and its monopolies of knowledge; he was critical of the effects of 
mechanization and the undue power it gave specialized groups at the expense of others; 
and he called for universities to reevaluate their role in society in order to confront the 
problems of Western society.
132
 Innis approached his subjects with an implied desire for a 
                                                          
130
  Carey, “Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan,” The Antioch Review 27, no. 1 (1967): 7. 
 
131
 Ibid.  
 
132
 Much like Carey, Innis had a consistent dialogic relationship with his profession as an academic in 
which he expressed views that were both critical and at times even radical. The core assumption in Innis’ 
critique of the university system was that, as a uniquely conceptual institution, the university was in a 
special position to contribute to social well being rather than simply serving the interests of the status quo.  
For example, Innis declared in 1948 that “[t]he universities should subject their views about their role in 
civilization to systematic overhauling and revise the machinery by which they can take a leading part in the 
problems of Western culture.” Innis despised the nature of specialization and professionalism insofar as 
they monopolized knowledge and privileged small groups of technocrats at the expense of the larger 
society. The university, he argued, should move to assuage this tendency of specialized knowledge to 
become monopolized by small groups by instituting a revitalized form of adult education programs to 
 
 67 
more humane society. Although this desire was sometimes concealed by his abstruse 
language and difficult scholarly prose, Carey very much admired Innis’ critical stance 
and humane desires. Carey wrote at length of how such a critical viewpoint separated 
Innis from the majority of postwar North American scholarship on communications, and 
how it came to influence the contemporary critical scholarship that was to come.
133
 What 
Carey found in Innis was a congenial mind and a new vocabulary for investigating 
technological change and human communication. As mentioned above, a fuller 
understanding of Carey’s brand of technological criticism requires a basic understanding 
of Innis’ concepts; in the following pages, I will review these foundational ideas.  
 Innis’ work in his Bias of Communication was a distinctive cultural approach to 
“media effects” research. His inquires focused on macro-historical trends in different 
ancient cultures such as the Egyptian empire and the city-states of Greece, and he 
examined the changes in the dominant mediums of communications in these civilizations 
and the political and cultural effects of these changes. He proposed that dominant 
communication mediums were central to these civilizations and that their respective 
“biases” determined the type of political systems and social organizations that took hold 
in a given culture. In this way, Innis was a conspicuous technological determinist; this 
fact was not lost on Carey, but Carey and other scholars bracketed this aspect of Innis’s 
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work, justly or not, focusing instead on the originality of Innis’ observations.
134
 Technological determinism is most often used as a pejorative because it implies 
an unnecessary reduction of human affairs to a single causal factor, in this case a 
technical form, and names it as the driver of social change. Indeed, some of Innis’ claims 
about dominant communications mediums—in particular, his claim that the inherent 
biases of a given technology determined the characteristics of a civilization—were most 
likely overstated. And the fact that Innis focused very heavily on the civilizations of 
antiquity for which there was less verifiable evidence than more current examples was a 
weakness of his methodology. For example, Innis claimed that the “[t]he discovery of 
printing in the middle of the fifteenth century implied the beginning of a return to a type 
of civilization dominated by the eye rather than the ear.”
135
 Such a claim is intuitively 
pleasing but verification of historical literacy rates are notoriously difficult to ascertain.  
In addition, the adoption of a technology by a large number of people cannot be 
explained solely by the introduction of a new technology; historical studies of popular 
literacy in England in the
 
sixteenth century and beyond, for example, suggest that 
individual reasons for learning to read were myriad and generally involved a motivation 
for access to the social world and information that print made available.
136
 Nevertheless, 
Innis’ intense focus on the social effects of communications mediums encouraged new 
and ambitious historical research that was both analytically inventive and culturally 
resonant in a society seeking answers in the midst of its own transition to electronic 
communications. Innis’ major contribution was to illuminate changes in the present by 
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examining those in the past. It is for these reasons that thinkers like James Carey, 
Marshall McLuhan, Neil Postman, and others venerated his work.    
 The physical form of a communications medium was important to Innis because, 
as he put it, “[t]he relative emphasis on time or space will imply a bias of significance to 
the culture in which it is imbedded.”
137
 Innis argued that communications mediums could 
be placed on a continuum based on their bias toward the control of either time or space. 
Innis understood that civilizations were appraised by their duration and control over 
territory, and so he argued that a communication medium’s bias towards either control 
over time or space would determine the character of its ruling institutions. A dominant 
medium’s “bias,” for Innis, affected the nature of the authorities that made use of the 
medium and the manner by which these authorities disseminated and controlled technical 
information. He called these forces “knowledge monopolies.” Innis examined in detail 
how new communications technologies tore apart old knowledge monopolies and 
replaced them with new ones. For Innis, technological change was not politically neutral; 
new technical apparatuses gave power to groups that were skilled in their use and 
manipulation, while taking power away from groups skilled in older technologies made 
obsolete by newer ones.
138
         
 Innis explained medium “bias” using the example of a stone carving. The carving 
was a form of media that was not easily transportable but was durable and long lasting; 
therefore, the carving was “biased” towards a temporal orientation rather than a spatial 
one. A stone carving’s messages were sent through time rather than space; the 
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communicative power of a carving rested on its messages to posterity. Thus, this time-
biased medium was useful for the maintenance of tradition and a shared history. A time-
biased communications system had less capacity for the expansion of secular authority 
through space, Innis argued. It was better suited for the continuation of hierarchy and 
religion rather than empire. On the other hand, the essential features of space-biased 
mediums, like paper and papyrus, were that they were light and transportable and thus 
better suited for the management of large areas. According to Innis, space-biased media 
were essential to the establishment of secular bureaucracies charged with the 
management of the state’s affairs and its territory. A civilization’s over reliance on space-
biased media conferred a “bias of significance” towards the conquering of space and 
hence the establishment of an empire. Carey interpreted this time bias/space bias 
taxonomy to mean that the “dynamic of social change” could be found in a type of search 
for alternative modes of communication between those supporting the “kingdom of God 
or man” respectively.
139
          
 To illustrate these concepts more concretely, a brief review of Innis’ analysis of 
ancient Egypt and how he applied the concept of technological “bias” to his historical 
interpretations is necessary. Innis examined the changes in communications mediums in 
the ancient Egyptian empire and argued that changes in their dominant forms of 
communications led to the decline of the autocratic monarchy. Innis chose autocratic 
Egypt as the archetypal “time-biased” civilization because the divine monarchy had 
emerged as the unified force that was necessary to utilize the periodic flooding of the 
Nile. The Egyptian religious authorities that controlled the knowledge of astronomy, the 
calendar, and related time-biased media became that culture’s emergent knowledge 
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monopoly. With control of such knowledge, the priestly class monopolized the means 
necessary to predict the river’s flooding, the cornerstone of ancient Egypt’s agricultural 
economy.
140
 Thus, the autocratic authorities of Egypt became heavily concerned with the 
management of time, continuity, ritual, and religion––and, according to Innis, overly 
reliant on time-binding media.       
 The resulting time-biased information environment in Egypt culminated in the 
erection of the pyramids and the mummification process that emphasized the monarch’s 
immortality. Yet the “monopoly of knowledge” held by a priestly class that was 
technically proficient in complex hieroglyphs and their time-biased mediums, such as 
stone carvings and pyramids, came to be challenged by increasing competition from 
paper and papyrus that were lighter and more easily transported. As the use of papyrus 
increased, so did written culture, and this led to the emergence of a professional class of 
scribes concerned with the bureaucratic necessities of the state and increased more 
secular forms of thinking. The practicality and usefulness of papyrus eventually took the 
“monopoly of knowledge” away from the priestly class and situated it in a more secular 
bureaucracy concerned with the expansion of secular authority and the administration of 
political power through space. Innis’ major thesis was that changes in communication 
media had the effect of diminishing the power of the religious authorities and increasing 
those of the state.         
 It is important to point out that Innis did not favor time-biased media over space-
biased media or vice versa. For Innis, mediums competed for cultural domination. I have 
bracketed many of the dense historical details of Innis’ time bias/space bias continuum, 
                                                          
140
 Innis, The Bias of Communication, 33-60; for more commentary on Innis’ analysis of Egyptian 
technological change see Vincent di Norcia, “Communications, Time and Power: An Innisian View,” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2 (1990): 335-357.  
 
 72 
but Innis’s major point was that a culture’s reliance on one medium of communication 
over the other (spatial or temporal) put a culture in a state of imbalance.
141
 Innis 
understood that all civilizations were shaped by time and space bias, but he emphasized 
the necessity for balance or equilibrium. In Innis’ terms, the bias of one communications 
technology could be counterbalanced by the bias of another. This idea that civilizations 
required some sort of equilibrium appealed to Innis’ sensibilities as an economist and it 
was a residue of the “society as a social organism” metaphor that was characteristic of the 
thought of sociologists such as Robert Park and Charles Cooley, who were scholars at the 
University of Chicago when Innis was a student there.
142
 Yet, as Carey correctly pointed 
out, Innis’ work was a turn away from the more romantic aspects of the University of 
Chicago School Of Sociology’s “society as organism” metaphor that glazed over 
historical facts of the asymmetrical power relations inherent to imperial civilizations.
143
 
 Carey was greatly influenced by Innis’ concept of the intimate relationship 
between space-biased media and empire. Carey, for example, pointed out that the first 
uses of writing and printing were not in the high-minded matters of literature, holy books 
and art, but rather in the practical matters of bookkeeping and in imperial matters of 
warfare, empire, and the state.
144
 Printing and its space-binding capacity, for Carey, 
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“encouraged the coordinated and systematic expansion of European empires.”
145
 
Therefore, following Innis, Carey sought to remind his readers that printing and writing 
came with both positive and negative consequences, encouraging expression while at the 
same time encouraging the expansion of authority and empire.    
 Speaking of newer technologies such as satellites and cable television Carey 
commented that “[w]e are witnessing the imperial struggle of the early age of print all 
over again but now with communications systems that transmit messages at the extremes 
of the laws of physics.”
146
 Like Innis, for Carey our society’s overreliance on space-
biased media reveled a new consolidation of powerful forces, such as the even larger 
federations of power growing out of the nations-state in that of multinational 
corporations. As he put it “multinationals could not exist without jet planes, advanced 
computers, and electronic communication.”
147
 Carey saw in electronics the possibility for 
the “indefinite expansion of the administrative mentality and imperial politics.”
148
 Like 
Innis, Carey was not optimistic about the changes he saw in his society and the 
technologies that were becoming dominant. But the bias of media towards the forms of 
authority that were encouraged was not the only form of analysis Carey utilized. Carey 
also wrote about the more individual consequences of technological change drawing from 
yet another, perhaps more well-known, Canadian scholar.     
 A somewhat similar notion of medium “bias” was also articulated in a less 
historically detailed way in the work of the wildly charismatic Marshall McLuhan. The 
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basic premise of his path-breaking book The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962) is that the 
medium is more important than the content it presents: “the medium is the message.” 
McLuhan argued that different mediums encourage different habits of mind; for example, 
he argued that the invention of print encouraged people to consume information in a 
linear, orderly fashion, while seated alone at a table, thus emphasizing individualism, 
specialization, and linear forms of thinking. According to Carey’s articulation of this line 
of argument, the printed page encourages a particular type of logic of experience, “the 
desire to break things down into elementary units (words), the tendency to see reality in 
discrete units, to find casual relations and linear serial order (left to right arrangement of 
the page), [and] to find orderly structure in nature (the orderly geometry of the printed 
page).”
149
 McLuhan theorized about the impact of a medium’s presentation on sensory 
experience, but Carey ultimately rejected McLuhan’s argument, because he did not 
believe that the effect of media on sensory organization was automatic or subliminal or 
that it occurred without resistance.
150
 Carey was suspicious of McLuhan’s claims, but he 
was nevertheless influenced by them when he claimed that the telegraph changed 
language use and the “structures of awareness,”
151
 but such observations faded in his later 
work as he came to focus more on technology’s larger social impact.
152
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In the 1960s, McLuhan’s influence was small among the larger academic 
community, although he was popular in the wider public. He viewed the emergence of 
the electronic age as a welcome change and believed it encouraged the establishment of, 
in his optimistic phrase, a new “global village.” The promise of electronic 
communications for McLuhan was to tear down the obstacles to human interaction and 
extend the human psyche through space. His work did influence the thought of some 
scholars, including not only Carey but also the communications theorist Neil Postman 
and the historian Elizabeth Eisenstein. Postman relied on McLuhan’s theories of medium 
in his analysis of the impact of television on public discourse, an influence he saw as 
being both corrosive and even dangerous.
153
 Eisenstein incorporated McLuhan’s theories 
on medium as a starting point for her massive historical analysis of the wide-ranging 
impacts of the printing press in Europe.
154
 Yet, these scholars differ from McLuhan in 
their approach and conclusions; Eisenstein added historical rigor to McLuhan’s theories, 
while both Carey and Postman incorporated his ideas in a way that deemphasized his 
optimism concerning the positive social outcomes of newer electronic media.  
 Both Innis’ and McLuhan’s influence on Carey can be seen in his essay on the 
impact of the telegraph. Carey argued that the telegraph encouraged the transmission of 
bits of information––simple facts in “telegraphic” language––instead of long-form 
essays.  This form of soft form technological determinism, in which the structure of a 
communications technology such as the printed page or the telegraph is believed to 
influence intellectual habits, led Carey to inquire about the uses and “bias” of 
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communications. He took from Innis and McLuhan the method of applying hermeneutic 
insights to material objects in order to analyze the impact of communications 
technologies and the deeper relationship between technology and ideology. But it was 
Innis that was the stronger voice in Carey’s analysis; in Carey’s view, McLuhan was the 
“fallen angel of the Harold Innis legacy.”
155
      
 McLuhan, for Carey, simplified the social impact of communications technology 
by focusing primarily on the sensory consequences of communications technology. Even 
though Carey’s analysis of the telegraph’s impact on journalistic style––in its favoring of 
the concise transmission of telegraphic information––owed to McLuhan’s the “medium is 
the message” thesis, this was not Carey’s major focus. As Carey put it, “[m]y argument is 
simply that the most visible effects of communications technology were on social 
organization rather than sensory organization.”
156
 Carey’s investigation of the telegraph 
was thus primarily an Innisian work, which can be seen clearly in his comment that 
“[w]ith the development of the railroad, stream power, the telegraph and cable, a coherent 
empire emerged based on a coherent system of communication.”
157
 Carey ‘s focus on the 
telegraph’s expansion and coordination of commercial, national, and imperial interests 
was due to his internalization of Innis’ space bias of media, and from here he added his 
own from of thought on technology as a ideological category.  
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From Time/Space Bias to the Ritual/Transmission Binary   
 As I have already outlined, Innis’ work was a significant influence on Carey’s 
thought. I have taken care to review Innis’ work on communications in order to begin to 
show the level of influence Innis had on Carey’s concept of the transmission and ritual 
views of communication and his attitude towards communications technology in general. 
The relationship between Carey’s transmission/ritual binary and Innis’ medium “bias” is 
not completely parallel, of course; Carey’s binary embraced two alternative views of 
communication present in American society, while Innis’ concepts were more of an 
analytic lens for examining the material dynamic of a communications medium and its 
consequences. Nevertheless, thematically the concepts are closely related.   
 Both concepts––Innis’ space/time medium bias and Carey’s transmission/ritual 
binary––divided communications into two realms: (1) the realm of the secular and the 
state, and (2) the realm of ritual and the sacred. Furthermore, both concepts emphasized 
the tension and competition between these two realms, but Carey held the necessity for 
ritual’s role in the production of culture and social life in higher esteem than did Innis.
158
 
Unlike Innis’ concepts, in Carey’s transmission and ritual binary, the ritual view served 
as the antidote to the imperialism and desire for social control contained in the 
transmission view. Whereas Innis hoped for equilibrium and balance, Carey hoped for a 
paradigm shift.          
 Carey’s ritual view of communication highlighted the role of the prayer, the 
chant, and the ceremony rather than the sermon or religious instruction because these 
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communal actions emphasized one’s place in the larger whole.
159
 Notice that none of the 
aforementioned acts of communication were technologically mediated but rather required 
the presence of bodies, which was very important for Carey. From Carey’s perspective, 
the embodied form of communication, by which he was referring to a conversation, 
required a base level form of democracy as both speakers are required to acknowledge 
one another in order for a conversation to take place. Carey argued that to emphasize the 
importance of ritual in the study of communication forced one to focus on the “oral 
formation of culture” because in ritual and conversation “signs have intrinsic agency” by 
“embodying and acting out the claims symbols have on us.”
160
 A simpler way to put this 
is to say that these forms of communication––conversation and rituals—encompass the 
entire sensory capacity of a person simply because of the body’s necessary presence.  
 Moreover, like Innis, Carey privileged the oral tradition over printed and 
electronic communications because technologically mediated communications like print 
gave rise to syntactical complexity and specialization easily monopolized by small 
groups. Oral traditions, on the other hand, could not be so monopolized.
161
 In much of 
Carey’s technological criticism, then, one finds a romantic desire for a return to a more 
oral culture in order to counterbalance the imperial “biases” of electronic media. Carey’s 
emphasis on dialogue, conversation, and debate as the proper means for democratic 
practice was also indebted to John Dewey. For Dewey, “[v]ision is a spectator; hearing is 
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 He meant “vision” to refer to the reading of a newspaper and “hearing” 
to refer to a dialogue between the members of a community. In Dewey’s formulation, 
“social intelligence” was most effectively transferred by word of mouth because this form 
of communication emphasized the need for not only a tightly woven local community but 
also the greater participation of its members.
163
 Carey looked on such ideas fondly, for he 
had the same veneration for community as Dewey. A firmly established practice of 
democratic dialogue, in Carey’s view, remained safe from the influence of imperial 
interests and commercialism, and it promoted a more primitive and necessary form of 
equality.          
 When viewed in light of his privileging of the oral tradition, Carey’s analysis of 
the invention of the telegraph, then, was based on a firmly critical foundation. The 
invention of the telegraph marked the beginning of the modern era of communications; 
for Carey, to perform an archeology of electric communications in the U.S. was to 
uncover the telegraph beneath the subsequent “revolution” in telecommunications. Carey 
understood that all communication technologies were built on the technologies that 
preceded them, or as he put it,  “when you peel back radio, you find the telephone; 
telephone the telegraph; telegraph the railroad; railroad the canal and turnpike; and 
beneath the turnpike early patterns of land and water commerce from the early days of 
exploration.”
164
 In Carey’s analysis, it was the telegraph that began the major acceleration 
of human triumph over space, and this acceleration culminated in the so-called 
“electronic revolution” that only further emphasized American cultural tendencies for 
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“expansion, spatial control, commercialism, and imperialism.”
165
 In this sense, drawing 
from Carey’s observations, the “electronic revolution” was not a revolution at all, for it 
merely extended the status quo rather than overturning it.     
 Carey argued that the telegraph was the technology that changed forever the way 
communication was viewed in the American cultural context. The telegraph established 
an essentially centrifugal force that “displaced older religious views of communications” 
and replaced them with the secular views for transmission;
166
 using Innis’ terms, the 
telegraph made for a new form of knowledge monopoly that served the interests of the 
emerging forms of American state capitalism and increased the administrative powers of 
the state and the coordination of its military.  Carey’s emphasis on the “ritual view of 
communications” as positive counterweight to the transmission view—embodied by the 
telegraph and subsequent technologies—does not imply that Carey proselytized for the 
expansion of organized religion as a solution to the secular forms of technocracy. He did 
not. But he did express frustration at the culture’s overreliance on space-biased mediums 
that minimized face-to-face interaction.
167
 Carey felt such face-to-face communication 
was essential to a fully functioning democracy and the maintenance of fuller and more 
authentic culture.         
 To younger readers, such a desire for a return to an oral culture might seem 
unreasonable, if not overtly quixotic. In this way, Carey was unapologetically old-
fashioned. He was also Hellenistic, as he admired the orality of ancient Homeric Greek 
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 The oral culture of the ancient Greeks has, of course, disappeared, and the 
advantages of a print culture gave rise to many of the modern advancements that we have 
today. For instance, even though Carey admired his work,
169
 Ong was not a major 
influence on Carey’s own scholarship. One reason for this was that Ong highly privileged 
the advantages of literacy over those of orality. Like Carey, Ong understood the essential 
communal nature of an oral culture and the alienation and necessary solitude inherent in 
the ways of knowing embodied in the written and printed word; nevertheless, Ong argued 
that literacy “is absolutely necessary for the development not only of science but also of 
history, philosophy, explicative understanding of literature and of any art, and indeed for 
the explanation of language (including oral speech) itself.”
170
 Also, it must be noted, 
Eisenstein also interpreted the rise of print culture to be integral to the spread of western 
forms of natural science––integral, because rationalism is embedded in the printed word 
in the following way: the printed word is a demanding medium that requires the reader to 
think in a linear fashion, slowly making judgments of truth and falsehood about the 
claims being made before him in the text. To read takes a certain form of discipline that 
requires of one to be seated at table and read in quiet contemplation. 
171
 In this way, the 
psychic effects of reading are to encourage rationality; to read is to reason. Additionally, 
as to its social consequences, Ong argued that literacy intensified one’s sense of self and 
that an enlarged sense of one’s being made for a “more conscious interaction between 
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 The expansion of consciousness that literacy encourages enlarged one’s 
worldview and, in Ong’s view, made for more meaningful social interaction. 
 This is not to say that Carey explicitly denied the positive effects of print or other 
space- biased media. As an academic, Carey himself was immersed in an information 
environment heavily influenced and dominated by the biases of print. The truth claims of 
print and exposition are heavily valued in academic circles and rest in the fact that in the 
process of writing a document––such as the thesis before you––an author is forced to 
place heavy consideration on the words used, the claims made, and the information 
presented. Moreover, print makes it necessary for an author’s claims and the evidence for 
them to be presented precisely and in a linear fashion. Carey’s thesis was that 
technological change could not solve problems that were intrinsically political or cultural, 
he paid close attention to technological change like McLuhan, Ong, and Innis before him, 
but overall he chose to view these changes from a higher point of view in order to detail 
its larger social impact.  
Space-Biased Technology: Nationalism and Empire.  
In terms of their historical impact on social consciousness, writing and printing 
are the most important communication technologies inventions to date. Nevertheless, the 
status of writing systems and the printed word as technologies has faded from view in the 
age of telecommunications and more impressive electronic media. Writing and printing 
have become seemingly natural parts of our daily lives. We forget that printing, writing, 
and alphabets had to be invented, that children must be educated at a very early age in 
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order become acclimated to these technologies.
173
 Yet printing and writing are 
technologies with long histories, and much has been written about both their positive and 
negative consequences.
174
        
 As to the negative consequences of print, for example, Carey was well aware of 
the relationship between the rise of nationalism and the rise of print culture. Not only was 
Carey informed by the “space bias” notion of Innis that tied a space-binding medium’s 
form to the rise of statist imperial interests, but he was also informed by Elizabeth 
Eisenstein’s McLuhanesque analysis of the effect of print culture on nationalism in 
Europe. Eisenstein’s historical research pointed to the fact that typographic fixity had 
made prominent the differences between the various “mother tongues” of Europe. The 
standardization of vernaculars brought about by the printing press built  “walls of 
language” around territorial lines; in other words, changes brought about by the printing 
press in sixteenth century Europe’s information environment planted the seeds of 
nationalism by a purification process of national literary cultures.
175
 Similar observations 
can be found in Benedict Anderson’s study of the origins of nationalism that linked 
capitalism and print culture together as being integral to the establishment of a national 
mode of consciousness.
176
 The invention of print conquered space in such a way as to 
unify and divide along the lines of newly established discourse communities colored with 
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the identity of the nation-state. In both Anderson and Eisenstein existed the type of 
analysis that was the cousin of Carey’s insights into the unique culture of American 
nationalism as the product of space-binding communications networks. 
 Carey’s analysis of American communications systems, from the telegraph 
forward, commented on how the epistemology (way of knowing) of medium changed the 
way individuals related to the “imagined communities” outside of their immediate 
experience and how they fitted into a newly integrated whole. Mass communications, as 
Carey put it, “allowed individuals to be linked, for the first time, directly to a national 
community without the mediating influence of regional and other local affiliations.”
177
 
This observation was not unique to Carey, but sometimes-obvious points must be made. 
In Carey’s view, a national consciousness in an individual was best conceived as a 
ritualistic process more akin to a religion rather than the byproduct of political 
economy;
178
 but it was these ritualistic processes that were made possible by the material 
forces of technology that overcame geographic boundaries and shaped the language and 
style of messages communicated. Carey’s analysis of communication as it related to 
national consciousness, then, contained a structural analysis of social organization 
characteristic of Innis and an analysis of the effects of a medium on individual 
consciousness characteristic of those like McLuhan, Eisenstein, and Anderson. 
 Carey’s synthesis of thinkers like Innis and McLuhan produced his multi-pronged 
approach to studying the changes made by the telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Much like Innis’ work on technological change, Carey focused first on the economic and 
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political impact of the telegraph and then moved on to its more psychic effects on 
language use and style. For example, in terms of its economic impact, the telegraph broke 
up the early forms of capitalist “city-states” in the U.S. (that is, urban industrial centers) 
and altered the ways they were managed before the telegraph’s separation of 
transportation from communication.
179
 The development of national communications 
networks in the United States, of which the telegraph and the railroad were the 
cornerstone, centralized business interests by finally linking together and coordinating 
large and geographically divided industries. As a result, business relationships became 
impersonal as pre-telegraph modes of personal business correspondence faded as the 
speed of transactions increased and were made more standardized.
180
    
 On a more general economic level, the telegraph had the effect of altering the 
forms of American capitalism in terms of its operation and organization. Carey pointed 
out that a new body of law and political organization became necessary to accommodate 
the new ecology of communications and transportation coordinated by the telegraph and 
the railroad.
181
 Note here that in Carey’s analysis of state, capitalist, and imperial 
transformations, he did not draw explicit boundaries as to the effects of the telegraph on 
those of private power and those of the state. This is because the rise of modern forms of 
industrial capitalism could not have occurred without the nation-state and its desire for 
the expansion and preservation of its power. Capitalism, in other words, rose in tandem 
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with the state as the existence of one necessitated the existence of the other;
182
 thus, the 
telegraph merely expanded the already existing space bias of American state-capitalist 
development.            
 At the individual level, Carey argued, local concerns were displaced by national 
ones with the spatial conquests of a national network of communications established first 
by the telegraph and then extended by film, radio, and television.
183
 Carey noted how the 
telegraph demanded a style of communication that stripped language of all local 
colloquial habits so that messages were uniform and standardized for the smooth 
transmission of messages from coast to coast. This disciplining of language by the 
telegraph changed the nature of journalism and created the well known from of “cablese,” 
a style of reporting stripped of all linguistic adornment. This style of analysis, attentive to 
the linguistic impact of the medium, was indebted most clearly to McLuhan, although 
Carey did not share the same technologically deterministic tendencies characteristic of 
McLuhan.
184
         
 Carey’s analysis of the effects of the telegraph on American society were thus a 
mixture of both economic materialism and philosophical idealism insofar as he examined 
both material and non-material aspects of the consequences of technological change. 
Carey managed to avoid the hard forms of technological determinism more characteristic 
of thinkers like Innis and McLuhan. This is more true of his later work on technology 
than of his earlier work with John Quirk, which contained, at times, deterministic 
language inherited from Innis. By the 1990s, Carey was careful not to reduce cultural 
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changes to purely economic terms or technological change, a charge that he leveled at 
Marxist-inspired cultural critiques and at McLuhan.  
Carey appreciated the chaos and complexity of the social world in a way that 
widened his view of technological change and, like a good pragmatist, avoided the search 
for any philosophical system in which to examine it. Therefore, G. Stuart Adams’ 
comment that “Carey’s [philosophical] system is complex” is simply nonsensical flattery, 
because Carey was not a systematic philosophical thinker but simply a very engaged 
social critic.
185
 Therefore, it can be argued that some of Carey’s most important work was 
his more explicitly moralistic analysis of technology and ideology, work that sought to 
counter the contemporary advocates of the “technological sublime” who believe that 
technology will solve the major problems of society in all realms both technical and 
cultural.  
“Technology and Ideology” 
The most interesting aspects of human communication for Carey were its 
ritualistic forms; in Carey’s framework, rituals were essential to a culture’s replication 
and continuation. So to read Carey’s critique of communications technology is to 
encounter a sense of loss and frustration as Carey’s “transmission view” of 
communication represented the encroachment of secular, national, and monopolistic 
interests on more authentic forms of cultural life, ritual, and democratic practice. For 
Carey, American culture contained an ideological notion of unlimited progress and 
“manifest destiny”, and this ideological stance was manifested in the physical 
embodiment of the “space biased” communications systems – these were extensions of 
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ideas that he inherited from Innis.  But unlike Innis, who was a writer that searched for 
explanations for the imperial aspects of his own civilization by looking at the economic 
and communications systems of civilizations in the past,
186
 for the most part, Carey 
focused instead on his own civilization with an eye towards its history and culture. Carey 
held the view that the U.S. was unique from other nations ideologically, geographically, 
and politically. For Carey, the U.S. was especially afflicted by the ideological 
presupposition towards technology as a self-perpetuating mode of technological progress, 
another component of his transmission view of communications.
187
  
 Carey’s exploration of the tension between the more ritualistic forms of 
communal life and modernity is a well-trod area of criticism. Technological criticism 
itself is indeed its own literary genre. One of the most well-known examples, albeit one 
of the most pessimistic, can be found in the French intellectual and lay theologian Jacque 
Ellul’s The Technological Society, a book that contains much lamentation about the 
encroachment of technology and modern technique on moral and spiritual life.
188
 Lewis 
Mumford’s The Myth of the Machine gave us similar gloomy prospects for the future 
based on his analysis of the overall trends of technological epochs throughout history.
189
 
Such technological criticism, including Carey’s, focused its attention on issues of 
technology and morality—how technology shapes human behavior and organization, how 
a technology changes the way a society views itself and its goals, and finally, how it 
changes the metaphors a society uses to understand the world.    
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 The introduction of the telegraph, for example, represented for Carey a 
technological change that had displaced older religious views of communication and 
replaced them with more secular views parallel with the interests of capital and 
centralized power. He once commented that “an essentially religious view of 
communication - or one cloaked, at least, in religious metaphors - is a mediator - a 
progressively vanishing mediator between middle-class aspiration and capitalist and, 
increasingly, imperial development.”
190
 Such was his articulation of the boundary 
between the sacred and the secular, a boundary eroded by the encroachment of a new 
electronic “knowledge monopoly.”        
 The best examples of Carey’s technological criticism were of course his essays 
written with his enigmatic student, John Quirk. Carey and Quirk’s work in this area 
stands as some of Carey’s most moralistic and didactic essays from a scholar who was 
known for his intellectual level-headedness. The type of criticism that Carey leveled 
against what he and John Quirk called the promise of the “technological sublime” was 
some of his most radical criticism of the culturally resonant notion of natural 
technological progression. Carey and Quirk taught their readers that technology should be 
viewed with skepticism as it always comes loaded with ideological presuppositions, 
unexpected consequences, and outcomes that benefit some in society at the cost of others. 
The type of social research that Carey and Quirk engaged in sought to confront this myth 
of coming technological utopia, not, incidentally, to add to the prestige of their discipline 
or discover anything new. There is indeed nothing new in Carey and Quirk’s critique of 
“mythos of the electronic revolution”; their points had been made before and will mostly 
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likely be made again. To this point, it is hard to resist quoting Neil Postman on this type 
of social research: 
Like moral theology, social research never discovers anything. It only rediscovers 
what people were once told and need to be told again. If, indeed, the price of 
civilization is repressed sexuality, it was not Sigmund Freud who discovered it. If 
the consciousness of the people is formed by their material circumstances, it was 
not Marx who discovered it. If the medium is the message it was not McLuhan 
who discovered it. The purpose of social research is to rediscover the truths of 
social life; to comment on and criticize the moral behavior of people; and finally, 
to put forward metaphors, images, and ideas that can help people live with some 
measure of understanding and dignity.
191
 
It is not difficult to find the same type of criticism in Carey and Quirk’s observations 
about the American ideology of technology written by writers that came before them. For 
instance, Alexis de Tocqueville noticed Americans’ peculiar notions about the 
possibilities of new techniques and technologies when he set about to explain American 
democracy to his European peers in 1835: 
“[t]he American lives in a land of wonders; everything around him is in constant 
is in constant movement, and every movement seems an advance. Consequently, 
in his mind the idea of newness is closely linked with that of improvement. 
Nowhere does he see any limit placed by nature to human endeavor; in his eyes 
something that does not exist is just something that has not been tried…Choose 
any American at random, and he should be a man of burning desires, enterprising, 
adventurous, and, above all, an innovator.”
192
 
Carey and Quirk’s essay, “The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution,” explored this 
aspect of the American character in more depth. In this essay, Carey and Quirk 
researched the work of a wide array of writers whose optimism for the future produced a 
quasi-religious faith in a coming electric utopia. One such example of this temperament 
was the nineteenth century economist Henry Charles Clay, who saw in the promise of 
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technology a way around the industrial nightmares of European wage slavery and 
environmental pollution.
193
 In their essay, Carey and Quirk took it upon themselves to 
“demythologize” such utopian rhetoric, and they used Innis’ notion of medium bias as an 
analytic tool to do so. Using more deterministic language, Carey and Quirk condemned 
all future intellectual endeavors towards the elaboration of proper technological 
application as inadequate because such attempts did not take into account the inherent 
“bias” of these technologies against “dispersed use and small-scale control.”
194
 This is 
because for Carey and Quirk, the space bias of electronic technologies would only build 
on the on the centralized, commercial, and national interests that previous technologies 
like the telegraph had expanded.        
 Yet, as is the case with many social critics, Carey and Quirk were armed with 
more problems than they had answers. Consider the following comments: 
Modern media of communications have, however, a common effect: they widen 
the range of reception while narrowing the range of distribution. Large audiences 
receive but are unable to make direct response or participate otherwise in vigorous 
discussion. Consequently, modern media create the potential for the simultaneous 
administration and control of extraordinary spaces and populations. No amount of 
rhetoric will exorcise this effect. The bias of technology can be controlled only by 
politics, by curtailing the expansionist tendencies of technological societies and 
by creating avenues of democratic discussion and participation beyond the control 
of modern technology. 
195
 
Carey favored of communication that is in a more literal sense communal; one can see 
this in Carey and Quirk’s wish for the creation of “avenues of democratic discussion” 
with an emphasis on discussion as the correct mode of communication for democratic 
practice. They wished for a new form of information environment to counter the 
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detrimental effects of electronic communications. But there was, of course, a problem. 
Because Carey and Quirk stressed the inherent bias of modern communications for social 
control, it is difficult to discern whether they believed that any form of electronic 
communication could be so conceived as to not emphasize any culturally imperial 
tendencies. Just because a technology has not been designed to increase democratic social 
tendencies does that mean that such technologies cannot be so designed (or so used). 
While it may be conceded that medium bias is at issue when it comes to communications, 
the authors did not mention in any detail the type of politics that might overcome 
technological bias towards anti-democratic practices and social control besides 
encouraging more discussion. Additionally, the possibility of avoiding the “control of 
modern technology” or rather the use of technology seems impossible in the 
contemporary United States, and the reader is left frustrated by an impossible situation, as 
the effects of modernity and mechanization are both ubiquitous and unavoidable.  
 The Non-Neutrality of Technology 
Paul Goodman once noted that “[w]hether or not it draws on new scientific 
research, technology is a branch of moral philosophy, not of science.”
196
  Carey took this 
insight even further when he commented that “[t]echnology, as a character in the 
American social drama, acts as a higher authority adjudicating claims of both truth and 
morality. As I have said elsewhere, in America it is the machines that possess teleological 
insight.”
197
 One may counter that such conclusions are overdrawn, but consider that the 
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mere existence of computers has vastly altered the metaphors in which we describe the 
human brain as something that can be “programmed” or “deprogrammed.” The computer 
has altered the way we conceive of human cognition such that humans are conceived as 
“thinking machines,” a conception that signals our altered perception of human 
consciousness. The brain is of course not a computer, and the use of a computer metaphor 
places limits on our understanding of the mind/brain interface just as all metaphors shape 
our understanding of the things they describe.     
 Over time, Carey’s stance evolved and he came to point out that technology was a 
physical embodiment of ideological propositions, moving away from some of Innis’ more 
technologically deterministic theoretical positions. Carey was always much more hesitant 
than Innis to grant technological forms and institutions the causal status that they seemed 
to have in Innis’ historical interpretations and his technological criticism became 
progressively more nuanced. By the 1990s, Carey viewed technology as a purely cultural 
phenomenon with a dialectical and reciprocal relationship to its users. For example, in 
1997, Carey claimed that: 
To view technology as thoroughly cultural is an attempt to escape, rather than 
reproduce, the endless and unproductive arguments surrounding technological 
determinism. From a cultural viewpoint, technological artifacts are understood, at 
least in a provisional and hypothetical way, as homunculi: concrete embodiments 
of human purposes, social relations and forms of organization. Certain 
technologies imaginatively constitute, express, and compress into themselves the 
dominant features of the surrounding social world. A homunculus is a society writ 
small. It is also a human person writ small insofar as it serves not merely as a 




This language was a much softer form of rhetoric than Carey had used in 1970 in that it 
was analytically a much softer technological deterministic stance. The bias of technology 
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for Carey here was simply a matter of what the form of a technology embodied as 
inherited from its surrounding culture.       
 Yet Carey never abandoned the notion of the “non-neutrality of technology” to 
borrow language again from Neil Postman. Technology is the means that people use to 
alter their world, and it is a form of technique and little more. While this is no doubt true, 
anyone who has heard the cliché “to the man with a hammer, the world appears as full of 
nails” and nodded approvingly has a basic grasp of the type of analysis that one finds in 
Carey’s meditation on the telegraph and of communication technology in general. The 
simple fact is that the material form that a technology takes has a significant impact on 
the uses to which it is put and the requirements it demands of its users. Atomic power 
plants, for example, require for their maintenance a hierarchal system of management 
equipped to respond quickly to a meltdown; in other words, its form limits its 
organizational possibilities and favors non-democratic over more democratic structures. 
Arguments over the causal factors of the hierarchical form that the atomic power plant 
encourages would be tedious, and perhaps unproductive, but the fact remains that its 
material form effects its organization and social impact––it is therefore not a neutral form 
of technology.  This is a form of analytically soft-technological determinism that is useful 
so long as it does not obliterate the possibility for an alternative and leave its readers in a 
state of despair.          
 Therefore it is safe to call Carey’s technological criticism a soft-form of 
determinism (as opposed to hard determinism—that is, he did not view technology as an 
independent and neutral driver of human society). What we can take from Carey and 
others in these matters is that the structure of a technology influences the uses to which it 
is put and that it can have unexpected consequences. This type of criticism is necessary in 
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culture that is at many times oblivious to the material consequences that a technology has 
and becomes even more necessary as technological advances occur more quickly than a 
culture has time to keep up with its impact. The iconoclastic analysis of Carey and Quirk, 
and others, remind us that change comes with both positive and negative consequences; 
and also that we should look to the changes of the past in order to assess the 
technological hyperboles of today. What is gained from reading such technological 









In March of 1974, Marshall McLuhan wrote a short letter to Carey in response to 
Carey’s essay with John Quirk, “The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution.” McLuhan 
was responding to Carey’s reading of him as a technological utopian, which he felt 
missed the nuances of his work. In his concluding remarks, however, McLuhan 
applauded Carey’s efforts and wrote, “[y]ou are familiar with academic timidity and 
respectability. You are taking your academic life in your hands when you write about 
Innis and McLuhan. You must be a fearless character.”
199
 McLuhan had a point: Carey 
was willing to take chances in his academic career, but the greatest chances Carey took 
were not with his essays on McLuhan and Innis. This fearlessness, if we may call it that, 
came from Carey’s willingness to have a constant and critical dialogue with the 
institutions in which he lived his life.       
 Upon his death in 2006, Carey’s son Daniel Carey, now a professor of English 
literature, commented on the dialogic and critical nature of his father’s work. Daniel 
Carey pointed out that his father’s scholarship was intimately related to his role as both 
teacher and administrator. Carey’s unique outlook, in that he was able to step outside of 
his role as a university professor and comment on the university from the point of view of 
an outsider, was connected to his personal biography. As discussed in the introduction, 
because of his congenital heart defect, he received little formal education before his mid-
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teens. When he became old enough to attend college, Carey lacked the credits to pursue a 
degree in a topic that interested him, such as philosophy or history, so he began his 
college education with the aim of becoming qualified for office work; he thought that he 
was not healthy enough for factory work or the military. So Carey’s undergraduate 
education at the University of Rhode Island consisted of classes in business and 
economics. After he finished his degree in business, Carey went on to the University of 
Illinois to get a master’s in advertising with the expectation of entering the business 
world. It was only after finishing his master’s degree that Carey decided to pursue the 
Ph.D.
200
            
 A combination of circumstance and chance led to Carey’s entry into academia. In 
addition to his hard work and intelligence, the increase in journalism and 
communications programs in the postwar period presented many opportunities to the 
young Carey. Carey benefited greatly from the expansion of the American university 
system during the Cold War that is only now beginning to recede. Shortly after finishing 
his Ph.D., he was able to become a full professor at the University of Illinois at age 28. 
Carey found himself teaching in a field that valued professional experience in journalism 
or advertising, when, of course, he had none. Carey, in essence, began his career as an 
academic as a relative outsider, but one whose talent could not be denied. Because of his 
unique background and temperament, Carey came to be one of the most eloquent critics 
of the positivism and behaviorism in his field because he was able to think both within 
and outside of his position.
201
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 The major intellectual antagonist that Carey fought against was, of course, the 
“effects tradition” in mass communications and positivism in the social sciences. Unlike 
critical theorists such as Theodore Adorno or Jürgen Habermas, who simply dismissed 
positivist social science for reducing large problems of political philosophy and society to 
abstract formulas, Carey confronted positivism head on. This confrontation was born of 
necessity; it was simply impossible for Carey to dismiss an academic tendency that 
surrounded him in order to make room for his style of inquiry derived from the 
humanities. In order to carve out a space for himself and others, Carey first had to deal 
with the “effects tradition” and explain why an alternative approach was necessary.  
 So Carey’s alternative path became his unique form of cultural studies. In a 
review of his book Communication as Culture, Kenneth Cmiel aptly pointed out that 
Carey’s project of cultural studies was a rather explicit reconstruction of American 
liberalism that steered between the lines of critical social science and behaviorism.
202
 
Carey was a type of pre-modernist who wanted to reconstruct, or at least make visible, 
older forms of communication that for him embodied a more authentic form of 
community and democratic discourse. Face-to-face interaction, conversation, community, 
and dialogue were the backbone of his explicitly liberal politics that sought to restore the 
“public” to the status of participant rather than passive observer. Walter Lippmann was 
thus his natural enemy. Lippmann viewed the public as simply incapable of managing 
their own opinions in an increasingly complex world; the role of the expert was to 
manage, with the aid of technical skill and science, the “bewildered herd.”
203
 As Carey 
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put it, Lippmann conceived of the public as “the objects rather than the subjects of 
politics.”
204
         
 Carey’s project of cultural studies drew from cultural anthropology and the 
Chicago School of Sociology’s symbolic interactionism with an implicit goal of placing 
the public back into view. His goal was to raise the status of the communal ritual and the 
sharing and creation of symbols and to advocate an anthropological approach to interpret 
these processes. Max Weber’s verstehen method and Clifford Geertz’s interpretive 
ethnographies, among other projects, provided the inspiration for a way forward in 
research and an embodiment of his liberalism. In Carey’s tradition, the public was no 
longer solely a subject to be assessed as to the effects that media had on it; rather, it was 
an active public with agency and intelligence that academics should seek to understand.
 But there was a weakness in his theoretical point of view. Carey’s veneration for 
ritual and community, partly inherited from Dewey, pushed into the background 
institutional forces, strong ones in fact, in which communities and rituals were enmeshed. 
Partly because he was distasteful of polemic, and partly because his early experiences 
with Marxism made him skeptical of research driven by adversarial politics, Carey 
avoided looking for the structural forces in the national media that shaped the 
conversation on the front end. Thus, Carey could seem hopelessly old-fashioned, a 
friendly and nostalgic old man who wished for the return of a communal existence that 
was not going to return. At worst, he appeared as someone completely oblivious to the 
major issues of asymmetrical power relations in his society. At best, he appeared as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the trampling and the roar of the bewildered herd.” Quoted in Barry D. Riccio, Walter Lippmann: 
Odyssey of a Liberal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 70. 
 
204
 Carey, “A Republic, If You Can Keep It: Liberty and Public Life in the Age of Glasnost,” in James 
Carey: A Critical Reader, 219.  
 
 100 
someone who simply avoided them. Even rituals can serve as a means to control others; 
American forms of consumerism, nationalism, and militarism all have their associated 
rituals. Carey’s avoidance of these issues was the major flaw in his thought. 
 Nevertheless, one can take inspiration from the democratic conversations and 
community that Carey held so dearly. Even Robert McChesney, in his criticism that a 
cultural studies that ostensibly avoids the neoliberal forces that are attacking the authentic 
forms of community it cherishes, acknowledged implicitly that such things are valuable 
and need protecting. Even if one dismisses Carey as a quixotic dreamer, a man who 
wished for a world that was long since past––if it even existed to begin with––there is 
still a sense of optimism in Carey’s work that those working in critical theory might learn 
from. Critical theory and some forms of neo-Marxist analysis of culture risk burying the 
public in an impossible situation from which they cannot escape. Carey’s democratic 
liberalism at least offers a glimpse of a possible form of salvation. Forging new 
communities and face-to-face communications with one’s neighbors are still the most 
powerful forms of political practice––Twitter notwithstanding. Protests and 
demonstrations of the Occupy Movement and other social justice movements draw much 
of their power from the fact that they are able to bring people together communally in a 
single space; Carey, had he lived to see the Occupy Movement, would have understood 
this. Carey’s vision needed more critical theory, and critical theory needs a bit more of 
Carey’s optimism. A combination of these two views would lead to a better 
understanding of communications, politics, media, and culture.
205
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 Carey’s technological criticism was not, as some might assume, explicitly 
connected to his writings on cultural studies and his critiques of positivism. There were 
no grand philosophical systems implicit in his work. Carey’s work on technology owed to 
his fascination with the work of Harold Innis, who for Carey exemplified the high point 
of a study of communications in North America. Carey’s work on Innis stands second to 
none; a casual glance of the secondary literature on Innis will attest to this fact. In the 
literature on Innis, the name James W. Carey abounds. I have argued that Carey’s work in 
technological criticism stands on the theoretical foundation that Innis produced. 
Although, Carey did not follow Innis into the harder forms of technological determinism 
that Innis often embraced, Carey’s theories were a form of soft determinism in that he 
accepted tentatively the inherent bias of communications technologies from the telegraph 
to the computer. He held that such bias had real effects on literacy and even how people 
think. It is the position of this thesis that these forms of analysis are useful insofar as they 
are not overstated; the relationship to one’s tools may be reciprocal, but they never 
necessarily determine human thought and action. Technology can be used many 
purposes, and it is the realms of culture and politics are the most determining factors of a 
technology’s use, yet, the physical forms of a technology are nevertheless important and 
worth examining.          
 Most importantly, perhaps, throughout his career Carey remained committed to 
the idea that technological change has thus far only maintained the existing forms of 
social stratification rather than disturb them. In this thesis, I have attempted to show that 
these observations were Carey’s most important contributions to our understanding of 
these issues. That is, for Carey, technology could not solve problems that are intrinsic to 
politics and culture. This observation was not new; indeed, other writers had said it many 
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times before in many different ways, but that makes it no less important. In this thesis, I 
have attempted to show that Carey’s most important messages were those that his readers 
already knew, but as Neil Postman observed they needed to be told again. It was in this 
way that Carey embodied the best of the public intellectual.   
 Carey’s observations about the culture’s technological utopianism with John 
Quirk were powerful social critiques, but they were again all too blind to the institutional 
conditions within which technology is produced. Nevertheless, Carey’s soft-determinism, 
his focusing on the outcomes that the forms of a technology produce, suggests a fact that 
is not readily acknowledged: technology can have both positive and negative outcomes. I 
agree with Lance Strate that Carey veered into the realm of “media ecology,” Neil 
Postman’s name for the study of information environments. This turn put his work 
alongside the likes of Elizabeth Eisenstein, Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, Walter 
Ong, and others who paid close attention to the subliminal ways that media affect how 
information is both presented and consumed and who critiqued the cultural effects of 
communications technology.
206
        
 An implicit question in this project has been,  "Why ought one read James 
Carey?” The answer lies in the admirable democratic ethos that underlies all of his work. 
James Carey was deeply attuned to the tensions between his institutional role as an 
academic and the greater society of which he was a part; that is to say, his work was 
engaged with what it meant to be both investigator and participant in the culture that was 
his object of study. In Carey’s words, “[w]e are not just neutral observers of cultural 
texts. Rather they confront us with claims and arguments about truth and rightness to 
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which we must assent or dissent.”
207
 The point here is that Carey wanted to make clear 
that there is no real position of objectivity that can be taken in social inquiry; there is no 
neutrality when one is faced with social questions because there is no way to remove 
oneself from the culture. Instead, there are professional ideals for objectivity, ideals that 
must be strived for, but nonetheless they remain ideals.      
 Positivist social research must pretend that it can detach itself from the society 
that it studies in order to reach objective conclusions, even though this is impossible. 
Carey disliked positivist social research because he viewed it as antidemocratic and 
believed it implied that social knowledge is accessible only to those with the proper 
training. This impulse in Carey––a distrust of experts and a combative attitude towards 
those detached and morally disengaged forms of professionalism––was not mere 
populism but his adherence to a profound democratic ethos. A democratic ethos means 
paying very close, constant, and even painful attention to what one is doing and one's 
motivations for doing it. Carey understood that his work was both an analysis and 
product of the American culture that surrounded him and was honest about it. He 
embodied this democratic ethos in his work and life, and if for no other reason, this is 
why we should remember his example.       
 Carey’s type of communications research may seem to some overly literary and 
philosophical, doomed from the start to failing Karl Popper’s test of falsifiability. But to 
come to such a conclusion would be a mistake. Carey’s type of thinking was original; 
there are few scholars who have reached across disciplinary boundaries with such a keen 
eye and productive synthesis. Carey offered no strict methodological process for studying 
the media, but instead provided an example of the values and attributes that a researcher 
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should embody. That is, to study the media requires a strong curiosity, keen perception of 
detail, and an ability to order the enormous amount of complexity that confronts any 
communications researcher. Carey’s scholarship was not without its flaws, but it engages 
its readers in conversations about media and scholarship that should never truly end. In 
this way, his contribution to scholarship was significant because the questions he left us 
have no final answers, as is the case with most truly important questions. It is up to us to 
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